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A COGNITIVE THEORY OF THE THIRD-PARTY
DOCTRINE AND DIGITAL PAPERS
H. Brian Holland*
ABSTRACT
For nearly 200 years, an individual’s personal papers enjoyed near-absolute
protection from government search and seizure. That is no longer the case. With
the widespread adoption of cloud-based information processing and storage
services, the third-party doctrine operates to effectively strip our digital papers of
meaningful Fourth Amendment protections.
This Article presents a new approach to reconciling current third-party
doctrine with the technological realities of modern personal information
processing. Our most sensitive data is now processed and stored on cloudcomputing systems owned and operated by third parties. Although we may
consider these services to be private and generally secure, the law does not
currently require the government to obtain a warrant to access our stored
information. The third-party doctrine creates a sweeping exception to the warrant
requirement for any information exposed to a third party—even where that third
party is an automated computing system rather than a human. As a result, our
personal papers now receive no more protection than any other piece of potential
evidence. In practical terms, they receive less. This ahistorical approach
undermines the essential balance between an individual’s interest in privacy and
the public’s interest in law enforcement. Many have identified and tried to rectify
the privacy problems created by the shift to third-party cloud-computing systems,
but it has proven difficult to articulate a limitation to the third-party doctrine that is
both consistent with existing principles and feasible in practice.
This Article begins with the intimate connection among freedom of thought,
privacy of thought, and the longstanding enumeration of “papers” as a distinct
object of Fourth Amendment protection. This historical understanding of the
relationship between human thought and private papers, which prior generations
recognized intuitively, now finds strong support in contemporary cognitive
science. Modern models of human cognition reveal how papers serve as cognitive
artifacts performing cognitive tasks. These models furnish a set of proxy
characteristics for reliably singling out those personal papers whose protection
would most likely serve constitutional values. The result is a coherent and
workable method for bringing needed discipline to the third-party doctrine and
restoring equilibrium to information privacy.

* Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law. Sincere thanks to Malinda L.
Seymore, Saurabh Vishnubhakat, and Kymberlie Welp, and to the participants in the Internet Law
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Oklahoma College of Law faculty exchange program for the many helpful comments.
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INTRODUCTION
For almost two centuries, an individual’s personal papers enjoyed nearabsolute constitutional protection from governmental search and seizure, even
against an otherwise valid warrant.1 In the latter half of the twentieth century,
however, these constitutional bulwarks quickly fell away,2 leaving personal
papers “no more likely to be excluded from evidence than [almost] any other
item.”3 For several decades, the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement
nevertheless worked as a fairly effective safeguard of personal papers.4 Although

1. See Laura K. Donohue, The Fourth Amendment in a Digital World, 71 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 553, 568 (2016) [hereinafter Donohue, Digital World] (“For nearly two hundred years, the
government could not obtain private papers—even with a warrant—when they were to be used as
evidence of criminal activity.”); see also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886) (describing the
broad protection for personal papers provided by both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments).
2. See, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 472 (1976) (finding no violation of the Fifth
Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination where the target of a search warrant was not
required to prepare, produce, or authenticate personal papers); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 309–
310 (1967) (eliminating the Fourth Amendment mere evidence rule as a basis for heightened
protection for personal papers).
3. Craig M. Bradley, Constitutional Protection for Private Papers, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
461, 473 (1981); see Donald A. Dripps, “Dearest Property”: Digital Evidence and the History of Private
“Papers” as Special Objects of Search and Seizure, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49, 50–51 (2013)
(describing the shift from “extraordinary exemption” to mere effects); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The
“Smart” Fourth Amendment, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 547, 597–98 (2017) (noting that personal papers
are much less protected by the Fourth Amendment in modern times than they once were).
4. The “warrant requirement” refers to the following standard: “Where a search is undertaken
by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing, this Court has said that
reasonableness generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant.” Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)).
A warrant may only be issued upon a showing of probable cause to believe that contraband or
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no longer afforded exceptional protection, under most circumstances personal
papers maintained a sort of derivative protection as material objects physically
located within well-established “constitutionally protected area[s].”5
The notion of real property as a constitutionally protected area had
essentially survived the transition from the property-and-trespass approach of
Olmstead v. United States6 to the expectation-of-privacy test adopted following
Katz v. United States.7 Likewise, the Court consistently recognized an
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy as to certain containers located
within those physical spaces, such as office furniture8 and desktop computers,9
where personal papers were likely to be stored. Even those personal papers
sealed in an envelope and entrusted to the post office for conveyance, and thus
outside the direct control of the sender, could not be searched without a valid
warrant, “as is required when papers are subjected to search in one’s own
household.”10 Thus, in an analog world of tangible documents—filed away in
cabinets and computers, stored in homes and offices, and conveyed through firstclass mail—most personal papers remained, as a practical matter, secure behind
at least two layers of constitutional protection.
It was not long, however, before this relative stability was undermined by a
radical transformation of the information environment, marked by the
emergence of ubiquitous networked computing, digital data, electronic
communications, and the commodification of information.11 A vast array of
common activities that were previously undertaken offline are now completed

evidence of a crime will be found. Id.
5. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (quoting United States v.
Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 n.3 (2012)) (noting the Supreme Court’s long-standing jurisprudence linking a
Fourth Amendment “search” to physical intrusion “on a constitutionally protected area”).
6. 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding that the wiretapping of conversations is not a search within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, which requires actual physical examination of one’s person,
papers, tangible material effects, or home), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967),
and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
7. 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (defining a Fourth Amendment search by
reference to an intrusion into an individual’s “constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of
privacy”).
8. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719 (1987) (citing various cases) (finding that
even public employees have, in certain circumstances, “a reasonable expectation of privacy at least in
[their] desk[s] and file cabinets”).
9. See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner, Fourth Amendment Future: Remote Computer Searches and the
Use of Virtual Force, 81 MISS. L.J. 1229, 1240 (2012) (describing the traditional search of a computer as
involving two entries, “one into the home or office, the other into the computer”); Orin S. Kerr,
Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 549 (2005) (“[T]he starting point for
applying the Fourth Amendment to a computer hard drive is clear and generally uncontroversial: the
Fourth Amendment applies to computer storage devices just as it does to any other private
property.”).
10. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878).
11. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-CIT-293, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY: ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 3, 10 (1985), http://ota.fas.org/
reports/8509.pdf [perma.cc/4KU2-P2EL] (“The existing statutory framework and judicial
interpretations thereof do not adequately cover new and emerging electronic surveillance
technologies.”).
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online, as we use the internet for communication, transactions, storage, and
more.12 These online activities generate enormous amounts of associated data,13
as “people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in
the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”14 Much of that data is processed and
stored by third-party intermediaries and online service providers in the regular
course of business.15 Conveyance to and retention of a user’s data by the thirdparty provider is no longer a byproduct of the commercial transaction between
user and provider, but is rather at the operational core of the service
infrastructure.16 Intermediaries collect and use data “in order to route
communications, detect spam and viruses, block computer hackers, or generate
advertising revenue.”17 Online service providers retain “[e]-mails, web-surfing
histories, cloud computing documents, search terms, and credit-card
information.”18 It is an infrastructure designed not to conceal and control
information but to expose that data as routine practice.
Given the vast quantity and expansive character of the data now held by
third-party providers, the absence of appropriate statutory and constitutional
protections threatens to undermine societal expectations for information privacy.
Indeed, there is an emerging consensus that rapidly evolving computer and
information technologies are outpacing the ability of our legal system to adapt to
the realities of digital data, networked infrastructure, changing human behavior,
and user expectations.19 And with each advancement, that lag is compounded at
an exponential rate.
How then should the law be revised to return equilibrium to information
privacy? Prior proposals have generally proceeded along one of two routes:
legislation modifying the Stored Communications Act20 or reform of the Fourth
Amendment’s third-party doctrine. In regard to the latter, proposals to modify
the doctrine can be difficult to formulate in part because its underlying rationale
12. See Lucas Issacharoff & Kyle Wirshba, Restoring Reason to the Third Party Doctrine, 100
MINN. L. REV. 985, 986 (2016); Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L.
REV. 581, 585 (2011) [hereinafter Tokson, Automation].
13. Tokson, Automation, supra note 12, at 588.
14. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
15. See id.
16. See Ahmed Shawish & Maria Salama, Cloud Computing: Paradigms and Technologies,
in INTER-COOPERATIVE COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE: TECHNIQUES AND APPLICATIONS 39, 48–52
(Fatos Xhafa & Nik Bessis eds.) (Studies in Computational Intelligence Vol. 495, 2014) (describing the
various models of third-party cloud services and the centrality of user data in each).
17. Tokson, Automation, supra note 12, at 602.
18. Id. at 588 (“These trillions of bytes of information can often be linked to the IP address and
then the name and home address of the individual user.”).
19. See, e.g., Monu Bedi, Facebook and Interpersonal Privacy: Why the Third Party Doctrine
Should Not Apply, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1, 19–28 (2013) [hereinafter Bedi, Facebook] (reviewing various
criticisms of the Fourth Amendment and third-party doctrine); Christina Raquel, Blue Skies Ahead:
Clearing the Air for Information Privacy in the Cloud, 55 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 467, 468 (2015)
(describing the Stored Communications Act as “[o]utdated and disjointed nearly three decades later”).
20. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2018) (providing a statutory framework for the disclosure of
“stored wire and electronic communications and transactional records” held by third-party internet
service providers).
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remains unclear.21 At various times, courts have described the exposure of
information to a third party as negating an individual’s expectation of privacy, as
signifying voluntary consent to disclosure of that information by the third party,
as assuming the risk that the information will simply find its way to government
officials in one way or another, or as some combination of these theories.22 Most
reform proposals attack the validity of one or more of these justifications, often
in the context of technological change.23 Critics have argued, for instance, that
the rule no longer reflects society’s expectations, or that disclosing data online is
no longer voluntary,24 or that application of the third-party doctrine to certain
forms of communication violates constitutional protections for interpersonal
relationships.25 Others have argued that user interactions with automated
systems, where human observation is possible but unlikely, should not trigger the
rule at all.26 This represents only a partial accounting of the numerous proposals,
which vary not only in concept but also in ambition. Some critics seek to
eliminate the rule in its entirety, while others call only for modifications that
might more equitably balance individual privacy interests against the interests of
society and law enforcement.27 It has proven difficult, however, to articulate both
an animating rationale and limiting principles that fit comfortably within existing
privacy doctrine and are workable in practice.28
21. See, e.g., Bedi, Facebook, supra note 19, at 11–14 (discussing various theories asserted to
justify the third-party doctrine); Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 561, 563–64 (2009) [hereinafter Kerr, Third-Party Doctrine] (same).
22. See United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2016) (discussing the various
theories); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (assumption of risk); United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976) (voluntariness and assumption of risk).
23. See, e.g., Steven M. Bellovin et al., It’s Too Complicated: How the Internet Upends Katz,
Smith, and Electronic Surveillance Law, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 7 (2016) (arguing that “in an IPbased communications environment, the concept of voluntary conveyance . . . is, at best, a legal
fiction”); Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment: Protecting Third-Party
Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975, 984–86 (2007) (arguing that
individuals may retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in information shared with a third party);
Marc McAllister, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: The Misapplication of Analogical
Reasoning, 36 S. ILL. U. L.J. 475, 482, 511–16 (2012) (presenting survey data purporting to “refute the
assumption of risk rationale”); Sonia K. McNeil, Privacy and the Modern Grid, 25 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 199 (2011) (challenging the notion of the third-party doctrine as a doctrine of consent).
24. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(suggesting that “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties” in the digital age (first
citing Smith, 442 U.S. at 742; then citing Miller, 425 U.S. at 443)).
25. See generally Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the Web and Other Fourth
Amendment Implications of Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L. REV. 614 (2011) (arguing that the current
“aggressive form of third party doctrine” applied to online activities and communications does not
reflect society’s expectations of privacy); Matthew Tokson, Knowledge and Fourth Amendment
Privacy, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 139 (2016) (describing how the concept of knowing and voluntary
disclosure is undermined by many technologies that society considers essential to daily living and that
integrate the disclosure of information to third parties).
26. See generally Tokson, Automation, supra note 12 (arguing that the “courts’ conflation of
disclosure to automated systems with disclosure to human beings threatens online privacy”).
27. See, e.g., Bedi, Facebook, supra note 19, at 17–18 (reviewing various proposed remedies).
28. See Saby Ghoshray, Privacy Distortion Rationale for Reinterpreting the Third-Party Doctrine
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This Article takes a different path. Accepting Justice Scalia’s implicit
invitation in United States v. Jones29 to revisit the core enumerated objects of
Fourth Amendment protection30—“persons, houses, papers, and effects”31—I
explore the functional import of “papers” in the maintenance of personal
privacy. For most of U.S. history, the significance of papers as a constitutionally
protected area remained practically obscured by other, more expansive privacy
doctrines like papers as property, shielded by the “mere evidence” rule;32 papers
as conveyed confidential messages entrusted to the U.S. mail;33 and papers as
effects, secured within private premises or closed containers.34 Even as personal
papers moved from the analog form to digitized files, the privacy analysis
proceeded by analogy along these same lines: emails to letters, computers to file
cabinets, and so on.35 But as information technologies continue to evolve, placing
“digital papers” beyond these traditional boundaries of what is private and what
is public, we must consider Fourth Amendment protections for papers qua
papers, apart from this protective overlay.
In this Article, I argue that the enumeration of papers as a discrete area of
Fourth Amendment protection—distinct from trespass upon real and personal
property (i.e., houses and effects) and bodily integrity (i.e., persons)—reflects a
unique and substantial concern for the historical sanctity of “an individual’s most
private thoughts.”36

of the Fourth Amendment, 13 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 33, 42 n.47 (2011) (providing an extensive
overview of various and diverse approaches to reforming the third-party doctrine).
29. 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
30. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 406–07 (holding that Katz supplemented, rather than replaced,
traditional concerns about government trespass upon the four enumerated objects of Fourth
Amendment protection).
31. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
32. See Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1308–14
(2016) [hereinafter Donohue, Original Fourth Amendment] (discussing the history of the “mere
evidence” rule). The “mere evidence rule” refers to the “former doctrine that a search warrant allows
seizure of the instrumentalities of the crime (such as a murder weapon) or the fruits of the crime (such
as stolen goods), but does not permit the seizure of items that have evidentiary value only (such as
incriminating documents).” Mere-Evidence Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 300 (1967) (explaining and rejecting the rule).
33. See Donohue, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 32, at 1307 n.728 (quoting THOMAS
M. COOLEY & VICTOR H. LANE, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 432 n.2 (7th ed. 1903)).
34. See Donohue, Digital World, supra note 1, at 678–79.
35. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2230 (2018) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(recognizing “letters held by mail carrier” and “e-mails held by Internet service provider” as
limitations on the third-party doctrine (first citing Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878); then citing
United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 283–88 (6th Cir. 2010))); Warshak, 631 F.3d at 285–88 (6th
Cir. 2010) (discussing the analogy of email to letters and phone calls); United States v. Forrester, 512
F.3d 500, 511 (9th Cir. 2008) (calling the “surveillance of e-mail addresses . . . conceptually
indistinguishable from” that of physical mail); Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 410 (4th Cir. 2001)
(“Courts have not hesitated to apply established Fourth Amendment principles to computers and
computer files, often drawing analogies between computers and physical storage units such as file
cabinets and closed containers.” (citing various cases)).
36. Eric Schnapper, Unreasonable Searches and Seizures of Papers, 71 VA. L. REV. 869, 890
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Freedom of thought has been “recognized for centuries as perhaps the most
vital of our liberties”37 and “the central liberty in our constitutional system.”38 In
the words of Justice Cardozo, “freedom of thought . . . is the matrix, the
indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.”39 But although
“[t]he freedom of individuals to control their own thoughts has been repeatedly
acknowledged by the Supreme Court,”40 the precise foundations and substance
of that freedom remain somewhat uncertain.41
Freedom of thought has been primarily connected to First Amendment
protections for speech, association, assembly, and the exercise of one’s religious
beliefs.42 In this regard, the more inward freedom of thought holds only
instrumental value (i.e., “value as a means to some other valuable end”),43 with
freedom of thought valued “as a way of promoting” these outwardly expressive
liberties.44 In addition, the “Court has also recognized the intersection of
freedom of the mind, protected by the First Amendment, with the right to
privacy.”45 As one scholar observed, “[t]he ‘right of privacy’ is more than a
physical dwelling, . . . it is the ‘privacy of thought.’”46 Indeed, it has been argued
that the “right of privacy [is] derive[d] from this respect for the individual mind
in both its intellectual and its lurid workings.”47
As the Constitution’s central privacy provision, the Fourth Amendment
reflects this relationship, preserving a protected sphere of respite and seclusion

(1985); see also Dripps, supra note 3, at 67–68 (describing concerns expressed in the early English cases
that the seizure of personal papers exposed a man’s secret thoughts).
37. Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 388–89 (2008) [hereinafter
Richards, Intellectual Privacy].
38. Marc Jonathan Blitz, Freedom of Thought for the Extended Mind: Cognitive Enhancement
and the Constitution, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1049, 1049 [hereinafter Blitz, Freedom of Thought].
39. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326–27 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395
U.S. 784 (1969).
40. Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 776 (7th Cir. 2004).
41. See, e.g., Blitz, Freedom of Thought, supra note 38, at 1051 (“[A]s central as freedom of
thought is to our constitutional system, it is also something of a mystery: the Supreme Court has never
said exactly what this freedom is.”); Adam J. Kolber, Two Views of First Amendment Thought Privacy,
18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1381, 1383 (2016) (“Many free speech cases trumpet our freedom of thought but
say frustratingly little about the contours of the protection.”).
42. See Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Where and Why of Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. SEE
ALSO 15, 15 (2009) [hereinafter Blitz, Intellectual Privacy] (“Freedom of thought has long been a
celebrated part of First Amendment jurisprudence.”). But see Kolber, supra note 41, at 1385
(“Constitutional protection of thought may emerge not only from the First Amendment, but also from
the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.”).
43. Kenneth Einar Himma, Privacy Versus Security: Why Privacy Is Not an Absolute Value or
Right, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 857, 879 (2007) (comparing instrumental value to intrinsic value).
44. See Kolber, supra note 41, at 1386–87.
45. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 777.
46. Claudia Tuchman, Does Privacy Have Four Walls? Salvaging Stanley v. Georgia, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 2267, 2280 (1994) (omission in original) (quoting Brief for Joel Hirschhorn, Esq., et al., on
behalf of The First Amendment Lawyers’ Ass’n, as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant at 20,
United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973) (No. 70-2), 1972 WL
136206).
47. Id. at 2282.
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as the “sanctuary where private reflections and inspirations may be created or
recorded without fear.”48 As Justice Brandeis famously wrote in Olmstead:
The makers of our Constitution . . . recognized the significance of
man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect . . . . They
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their
emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the
Government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right,
every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of
the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a
violation of the Fourth Amendment.49
Thus, just as freedom of thought holds instrumental value as a means of
promoting outwardly expressive liberties, privacy of thought holds instrumental
value as a means of promoting freedom of thought by preserving a protected
sphere for the workings of the mind.
The history of the Fourth Amendment reflects this conspicuous connection,
not only between freedom of thought and the right to privacy but to the
enumeration of papers as a distinct area of protection. English cases and
parliamentary debates of the late eighteenth century condemned the use of
general warrants to search a man’s papers, not simply because papers are a form
of property but because papers reveal “the private workings of a person’s
mind.”50 In the United States, early state constitutions reflected this view as well,
distinguishing textually (as does the Fourth Amendment) between papers and
other forms of property.51 And the Supreme Court, in one of its earliest privacy
decisions, embraced the influence of English law on the structure and
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment by, inter alia, acknowledging and
adopting a special concern for invasions upon personal papers.52 But these
eighteenth-century decisions proved to be the “high-water mark” for the special
status of papers.53 Over the past century, broad rules based on binary distinctions
(e.g., seclusion versus trespass, private versus public, and concealment versus
disclosure) have subsumed this unique concern for personal papers almost to the
point of vanishing.54 The unique connection between personal papers and

48. Comment, The Rights of Criminal Defendants and the Subpoena Duces Tecum: The
Aftermath of Fisher v. United States, 95 HARV. L. REV. 683, 699 (1982).
49. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
50. Dripps, supra note 3, at 66–67.
51. See Donohue, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 32, at 1264–80 (discussing the various
state provisions).
52. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886) (“The search for and seizure of stolen or
forfeited goods, or goods liable to duties and concealed to avoid the payment thereof, are totally
different things from a search for and seizure of a man’s private books and papers for the purpose of
obtaining information therein contained, or of using them as evidence against him.”).
53. See Ferguson, supra note 3, at 597.
54. See Colleen Maher Ernst, Note, Looking Back To Look Forward: Reexamining the
Application of the Third-Party Doctrine to Conveyed Papers, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 329, 334–42
(2014) (discussing the foundation of applying the third-party doctrine to private papers).
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freedom of thought has been all but lost in the muddle of shifting Fourth
Amendment theory and jurisprudence.
The goal of this Article is to offer a rationale for restoring the special status
of papers by reestablishing their connection to and necessity for freedom of
thought. More specifically, I argue that the significance of papers as a
constitutionally protected area under the Fourth Amendment is in the function
of papers and their digital equivalents as cognitive artifacts—objects or devices so
broadly “incorporated into the very mechanisms of . . . human thought” as to
demand privacy protection as a necessary condition to freedom of thought.55 As
part of a functionally integrated cognitive system, cognitive artifacts “represent,
store, retrieve and manipulate information.”56 In practice, cognitive artifacts and
technologies are quite familiar—from language and writing to computing and the
internet.57 And most of us can appreciate that these devices alter our thought
processes by mediating our experiences and allowing us to offload various
cognitive tasks. Although more modern technologies may illuminate our growing
reliance on papers and their digital equivalents as cognitive artifacts, our reliance
on cognitive artifacts is hardly a new phenomenon. For centuries, we have stored
our personal memories in diaries, relied on books for facts about the larger
world, and facilitated our relationships through handwritten letters.58 The idea of
papers as cognitive artifacts—as essential components of human cognitive
processes—is entirely consistent with the experience of those who drafted and
ratified the U.S. Constitution.
If we acknowledge our constitutional commitment to freedom of thought,
then we must likewise recognize the need to safeguard the cognitive mechanisms
that are necessary to effectuate that freedom. Those who gave birth to the
Fourth Amendment understood this and expressly provided for such protections
by securing “papers” against unreasonable search and seizure.59 In the present
information environment, however, where cognitive artifacts are no longer
concealed within physical space but are instead distributed across third-party
cloud-computing networks, existing jurisprudence fails this obligation.60 This
Article offers a proposal for restoring exceptional Fourth Amendment
protections to papers and their digital equivalents by reforming current doctrine
to meet the challenges of modern technologies.

55. Harry Collins, Andy Clark & Jeff Shrager, Keeping the Collectivity in Mind?, 7
PHENOMENOLOGY & COGNITIVE SCI. 353, 361 (2008) (Clark’s “The Blind Carpenter: A Reply to
Harry Collins”).
56. Philip Brey, The Epistemology and Ontology of Human-Computer Interaction, 15 MINDS &
MACHINES 383, 385 (2005) [hereinafter Brey, Human-Computer Interaction].
57. See Edwin Hutchins, Cognitive Artifacts [hereinafter Hutchins, Cognitive Artifacts]
(discussing various examples of cognitive artifacts), in THE MIT ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE COGNITIVE
SCIENCES 126, 126–27 (R.A. Wilson & F.C. Kell eds., 2001).
58. See generally Donald A. Norman, Cognitive Artifacts, in DESIGNING INTERACTION:
PSYCHOLOGY AT THE HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERFACE 17 (1991).
59. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
60. See David A. Couillard, Note, Defogging the Cloud: Applying Fourth Amendment Principles
to Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud Computing, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2205, 2218 (2009).
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The Article proceeds in three sections. In Section I, I outline the relevant
legal landscape, tracing the evolution of modern Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence and the emergence of the third-party doctrine. In Section II, I
describe the profound transformation of the digital age, focusing on digitized
electronic communication and cloud computing. I then explore application of the
third-party doctrine in an online environment where personal information is
exposed to third-party intermediaries and online service providers as a matter of
course. I conclude that, in practical application, the third-party doctrine creates
an exception to the warrant requirement that all but swallows the general rule
that warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable.
In Section III, I propose exempting a relatively narrow class of digital
papers from the third-party doctrine, thereby requiring the government to secure
a Fourth Amendment warrant prior to a search or seizure of those documents
from a third-party intermediary or online service provider. My proposal is
constructed in three steps. In step one, I describe the relationship between
freedom of thought as a constitutional commitment and privacy of thought as an
essential condition for its realization. I then argue that freedom of thought and
privacy of thought were historically connected to the enumeration of papers as a
distinct object of Fourth Amendment protection. In step two, I seek to revive
this connection by offering a new perspective on the role of personal papers in
the processes of thought. I begin by introducing various models of human
cognition and then explain how personal papers may be conceptualized as
cognitive artifacts functioning as components of these systems. This account is
consistent, I argue, with the intuition of prior generations that personal papers
are deserving of extraordinary protection. In step three, I propose changes to the
third-party doctrine intended to reestablish enhanced constitutional safeguards
for certain personal papers. Integrating historical insight with modern cognitive
theory, I set forth a method by which to identify a subset of personal papers, the
protection of which is most likely to serve our commitment to freedom of
thought.
I.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE

The Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has been described
as “an incoherent mess.”61 The third-party doctrine has been called “the Fourth
Amendment rule scholars love to hate.”62 But how did we reach this wretched
state?

61. Nicholas Kahn-Fogel, An Examination of the Coherence of Fourth Amendment
Jurisprudence, 26 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 275, 276, 278–92 (2016) (providing an extensive review
of scholarship making this general argument).
62. Kerr, Third-Party Doctrine, supra note 21, at 563; see also Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.
Ct. 2206, 2262 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“[C]ountless scholars . . . have come to conclude that
the ‘third-party doctrine is not only wrong, but horribly wrong.’” (quoting Kerr, Third-Party Doctrine,
supra note 21, at 564 (footnotes omitted))).
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Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence

The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause.”63 The Supreme Court has traditionally read the
Amendment’s substantive reasonableness clause and procedural warrant clause
as interrelated, such that warrantless searches are said to be presumptively or
even per se unreasonable.64 In practice, however, the warrant requirement often
offers little resistance.65 Indeed, far from settling the question, the absence of a
warrant merely reframes the inquiry. First, the lack of a warrant may be
overcome by a showing that no search or seizure took place and therefore no
warrant was required.66 Second, even where a search has occurred, the
government’s actions may be excused under one of the numerous exceptions to
the warrant requirement developed by the Court.67 Finally, any surviving
violation of the Fourth Amendment may be neutralized by failing to apply the
exclusionary rule.68
It is this first question—whether a search has taken place—that dominates
much of the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Prior to 1967, a Fourth
Amendment search was defined as a “physical intrusion [into] a constitutionally
protected area in order to obtain information.”69 In applying this standard, a
protected area was defined by an individual’s property ownership or possessory
rights in the object or location of the search.70 And a physical intrusion was
defined by reference to common law trespass.71 The Court formally abandoned

63. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
64. See Wayne D. Holly, The Fourth Amendment Hangs in the Balance: Resurrecting the
Warrant Requirement Through Strict Scrutiny, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 531, 541–43 (1997)
(discussing the relationship between Fourth Amendment warrants and reasonableness, and the
Supreme Court’s asserted preference for the traditional warrant requirement); see also Carpenter, 138
S. Ct. at 2221 (“[W]arrantless searches are typically unreasonable . . . [unless they] fall[] within a
specific exception to the warrant requirement.” (citation omitted)).
65. Brent E. Newton, The Real-World Fourth Amendment, 43 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 759, 766
(2016) (“[I]n the vast majority of situations, a search warrant or an arrest warrant is not required for a
‘reasonable’ search or seizure to occur.”).
66. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (“[T]he antecedent question whether
or not a Fourth Amendment ‘search’ has occurred is not so simple under our precedent.”).
67. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 4.1(b) (5th ed. 2017). There are six major exceptions to the warrant requirement (i.e.,
circumstances under which the government is permitted to conduct a search without first obtaining a
warrant). Id. These exceptions include search incident to lawful arrest, the plain view exception,
consent, stop and frisk, the automobile exception, and emergencies or hot pursuit. Id.
68. See generally 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 1.1 (5th ed. 2017). The exclusionary rule provides that evidence obtained in violation
of an individual’s constitutional rights be excluded from evidence at trial. Id.
69. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509–512 (1961)).
70. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012) (discussing the Fourth Amendment’s
“close connection to property”).
71. See id. at 405 (“[O]ur Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass,
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this property-and-trespass approach in Katz.72 Observing that “the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places,”73 the Court rejected formal, propertybased limitations on the scope of Fourth Amendment protections,74 focusing
instead on whether government agents had violated the individual’s “reasonable
expectation of privacy.”75 Under this formulation, a Fourth Amendment search
requires “first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as [objectively] ‘reasonable.’”76 The Katz standard has governed
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence for nearly five decades and remains the
dominant standard for determining whether a search has taken place.77
In application, however, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has been unable
to shed the binary distinctions of the pre-Katz era, such that privacy tends to be
conceptualized as “a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all.”78
Although couched as a contextual analysis, the Katz standard remains
persistently bound to physical seclusion and concealment. What is reasonable
“under the circumstances”79 is nearly always to maintain absolute obscurity,
from both the government and the public generally. As applied to tangible
objects in the terrestrial domain, seclusion is correlated with the right to exclude
and thus remains centralized around property rights and physical intrusion.80 But

at least until the latter half of the 20th century.” (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001)));
Nita A. Farahany, Searching Secrets, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1239, 1244–46 (2012) (observing that Fourth
Amendment doctrine is grounded in property concepts); see also Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct.
2206, 2213–14 (2018) (referencing the historical connection between Fourth Amendment protections
and trespass upon property).
72. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350–51 (1967).
73. Id. at 351.
74. Id. at 350–51.
75. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213–14 (discussing the
Katz approach).
76. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
77. See, e.g., Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213–14 (discussing the Katz reasonable expectation of
privacy standard).
78. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
79. Katz, 389 U.S. at 355 (quoting Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 57 (1967)).
80. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978) (“Legitimation of expectations of
privacy by law must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts
of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.
One of the main rights attaching to property is the right to exclude others, and one who owns or
lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by
virtue of this right to exclude. Expectations of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment, of course,
need not be based on a common-law interest in real or personal property, or on the invasion of such an
interest. These ideas were rejected both in Jones and Katz. But by focusing on legitimate expectations
of privacy in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has not altogether abandoned use of
property concepts in determining the presence or absence of the privacy interests protected by that
Amendment.” (citations omitted)); see also Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 183–84 (1984). In
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018), the majority opinion and each of the four dissenting
opinions reaffirmed the connection between Fourth Amendment protections and trespass-uponproperty. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213–14; id. at 2227 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Katz did not
abandon reliance on property-based concepts.”); id. at 2235–36 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (rejecting
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even here, mere seclusion is not always sufficient. In certain circumstances,
physical trespass across property lines is permitted without triggering a Fourth
Amendment search, even where the property owner has taken significant efforts
to deter others from accessing the area.81 Likewise, many invasive technologies
that permit the government to gain information from secluded areas beyond the
property line do not constitute a trespass or intrusion at all.82
The failure of seclusion, whether by property interest or physical barriers,
places far greater pressure on concealment to secure one’s privacy interest. The
Supreme Court’s 1986 decision in California v. Ciraolo83 demonstrates this point.
Ciraolo maintained a marijuana garden in his yard, closely adjacent to his
home.84 His yard was completely enclosed by a six-foot outer fence, and the
marijuana garden itself was enclosed within a second, ten-foot inner fence.85 As a
result, the garden was entirely obscured from ground-level observation.86
Undeterred, local police “secured a private plane and flew over [Ciraolo’s] house
at an altitude of 1,000 feet,”87 from which they observed and photographed the
marijuana plants growing below.88 The Court held that no search had occurred in
this case because Ciraolo’s clear subjective expectation of privacy, evidenced by
seclusion of the marijuana behind multiple tall fences,89 was not one that society
was willing to recognize as legitimate.90 Although cast as a test of contextual
reasonableness, this conclusion is grounded firstly in bright-line distinctions
between concealment and disclosure.
As the Court observed in Katz, “[W]hat a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection.”91 Public exposure is in turn defined not by reference to active

Katz in favor of a property-based approach); id. at 2260 (Alito, J., dissenting) (characterizing United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), and Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), as turning on the
defendants’ lack of property rights in the property of another); id. at 2267–71 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that a return to property concepts might resolve difficulties arising in regards to the thirdparty doctrine).
81. See, e.g., United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 296 (1987) (holding that erecting multiple
ranch style fences across an open field does not create an expectation of privacy); Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984) (holding that erecting fences and “No Trespassing” signs, even on
secluded land, did not create an expectation of privacy in an open field).
82. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (holding that aerial
photographs taken using a standard precision aerial mapping camera did not constitute a search, even
where the target used elaborate security around the perimeter to entirely obscure ground-level views);
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214 (1986) (holding that aerial observation of a fenced-in backyard
within the curtilage of a home did not constitute a search).
83. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
84. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213.
85. Id. at 209.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 211.
90. Id. at 214.
91. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). But see Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.
Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (indicating, without full elaboration, that this is not a per se rule, as “[a] person
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disclosure or the reasonableness of one’s efforts to maintain practical obscurity
through seclusion but rather by near-perfect concealment. Whatever law
enforcement is able to observe from a vantage point to which they have legal
access92—whether by crossing open fields surrounded by fencing,93 by peering
through a small knothole in a tall fence,94 or by hiring a small plane to fly
through unrestricted airspace95—has been exposed to the public and thus loses
all protection under the Fourth Amendment. In the absence of complete and
total concealment, the individual is said to assume the risk that the government
will gain access to even the most secluded areas, even if by extraordinary or
unexpected means.96
This assumption of risk rationale is applied to “intangible” information in a
second, related line of cases involving the disclosure of information to
undercover and confidential informants.97 These informant cases place the
dominance of the concealment-disclosure distinction in sharp relief. For just as
considerable efforts to seclude tangible property have often proven legally
insufficient in the absence of absolute concealment, only absolute silence ensures
the maintenance of one’s privacy interest in information. The Court has
repeatedly held that you rarely enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in your
oral communications with another, even a trusted associate or a false friend,98 as
you necessarily assume the risk that your confidence will be betrayed.99 As the
Court remarked in United States v. White,100 “however strongly a defendant may
trust an apparent colleague, his expectations in this respect are not protected,”101

does not surrender all Fourth Amendment protection by venturing into the public sphere”).
92. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213 (“[T]he mere fact that an individual has taken measures to restrict
some views of his activities [does not] preclude an officer’s observations from a public vantage point
where he has a right to be and which renders the activities clearly visible.” (citing United States v.
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983))).
93. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 303–04 (1987); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170,
179–80 (1984).
94. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 210 (discussing with approval California’s analogy between overflight
and observation through “a knothole or opening in a fence”).
95. Id. at 213–14.
96. Id. at 211–14 (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy where a ten-foot fence
surrounding marijuana plants on private property “might not shield these plants from the eyes of a
citizen or a policeman perched on the top of a truck or a two-level bus”).
97. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971) (holding that the defendant assumed
the risk that his companions might share the content of their conversations with police, even by radio
transmitter); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (holding that the defendant assumed the
risk that his companions might share the content of their conversations with police and testify as to
that content); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438–40 (1963) (holding that the defendant
assumed the risk that his companions might share the content of their conversations with police,
including by using a hidden recording device).
98. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 753–54 (1952) (finding no Fourth Amendment
violation where defendant was simply “talking . . . indiscreetly with one he trusted”).
99. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment [does not] protect[] a wrongdoer’s
misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.”).
100. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
101. White, 401 U.S. at 749.
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as the Fourth Amendment simply does not credit “a wrongdoer’s misplaced
belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not
reveal it.”102 Once again, attempts at seclusion—in the form of physical barriers
(meeting in a home or office) and restricted access (limiting oneself to close
confidants)—have proven insufficient to establish a legitimate privacy interest.103
Only absolute concealment through absolute silence will suffice.104
B.

The Third-Party Doctrine

The third-party doctrine emerged from two strands of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence—the public exposure cases105 and the informant cases106—both of
which developed prior to Katz but survived the transition from spatial privacy to
protections grounded in one’s reasonable expectation of privacy.107 Indeed, Katz
made this connection explicitly. First, the Court enunciated the rule at the heart
of the third-party doctrine: “What a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection.”108 Second, the Court supported this assertion with citations to two
cases: United States v. Lee,109 a public exposure case involving the observation of
contraband visible on the deck of a boat at sea,110 and Lewis v. United States,111
an informant case involving an undercover agent invited into the defendant’s
home.112
The Court affirmed this approach just four years later in White, in which it
confirmed the continuing validity of its informant jurisprudence post-Katz.113
Defendant White sought to exclude the testimony of government agents
regarding the content of conversations between himself and a cooperating
informant, including at least one conversation that took place within White’s

102. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302.
103. See, e.g., White, 401 U.S. at 747 (finding no legitimate privacy interest where a government
informant brought a radio transmitter into the defendant’s home and automobile); Hoffa, 385 U.S. at
301–02 (finding that seclusion within a constitutionally protected physical area does not create a
legitimate privacy interest in conversations with a third-party cooperating witness, even where that
witness could be characterized as a close confidant).
104. See, e.g., White, 401 U.S. at 762–65 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (describing the chilling effect of
the third-party doctrine and the assumption of risk rationale).
105. See Kerr, Third-Party Doctrine, supra note 21, at 570–71 (discussing the exposure aspect of
the third-party doctrine).
106. See id. at 567–69 (discussing the informant cases); Michael W. Price, Rethinking Privacy:
Fourth Amendment “Papers” and the Third-Party Doctrine, 8 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 247, 266–
67 (2016) (same).
107. Tokson, Automation, supra note 12, at 598; see also White, 401 U.S. at 749 (holding that
these cases were “left undisturbed by Katz”).
108. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
109. 274 U.S. 559 (1927).
110. See Lee, 274 U.S. at 563.
111. 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
112. See Lewis, 385 U.S. at 206–07.
113. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 750 (1971).
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home.114 The Court held that White’s expectation of privacy in any information
shared with a third party was not justified115 and that White had assumed the risk
that the informant might share the content of their conversations with police.116
Thus, by failing to maintain absolute concealment through absolute silence,
White had obviated any legitimate privacy interest in the information that he
revealed.
These basic principles would serve as the foundation of the modern thirdparty doctrine, which allows the government to obtain information from third
parties without first procuring a search warrant.117 In the first of two leading
cases, United States v. Miller,118 the Court upheld the use of a third-party
subpoena to obtain the bank records of the defendant.119 Starting from the basic
proposition in Katz—that information exposed to the public is no longer
protected by the Fourth Amendment120—the Court found no reasonable
expectation of privacy in “information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and
exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business.”121 Relying on the
informant cases, the Court concluded that Miller “[took] the risk, in revealing his
affairs to another, that the information would be conveyed by that person to the
Government,”122 even where the information was revealed only for a limited
purpose.123 Here, the information provided to the government included deposit
slips, checks, and account statements124—documents used by the account holder
primarily to facilitate transactions with third parties and to manage the financial
aspects of business operations.125 Although the account holder maintained an
independent relationship with the bank, these documents primarily related to
these external concerns. The bank acted, in essence, as a transactional
intermediary.126
114. Id. at 746–47.
115. Id. at 749.
116. Id. at 752.
117. See Kerr, Third-Party Doctrine, supra note 21, at 563 (“By disclosing to a third party, the
subject gives up all of his Fourth Amendment rights in the information revealed.”).
118. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
119. Miller, 425 U.S. at 436–37.
120. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
121. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.
122. Id. at 443 (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751–52 (1971)); see also Carpenter v.
United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018) (describing Miller’s reliance on an assumption of risk
rationale).
123. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (confirming that the third-party doctrine applies “even if the
information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the
confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed” (first citing White, 401 U.S. at 752; then
citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); and then citing Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S.
427 (1963))).
124. Id. at 438.
125. See id. at 448 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that the records in question were
“transmit[ted] to the bank in the course of his business operations” (quoting Burrows v. Superior
Court, 529 P.2d 590, 593 (Cal. 1974))).
126. See Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
3, 41 (2007) (describing the bank employees in Miller as “human intermediaries”).
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The second of these cases, Smith v. Maryland,127 applied this same approach
to a form of “intangible” information.128 Smith was suspected in a robbery and
stalking incident, wherein someone made threatening and obscene phone calls to
the victim.129 At the request of police, but without a warrant, “the telephone
company . . . installed a pen register at its central offices to record the numbers
dialed from the telephone at [Smith’s] home.”130 Prior to trial, Smith
unsuccessfully “sought to suppress ‘all fruits derived from the pen register’ on
the ground that the police had failed to secure a warrant prior to its
installation.”131 Affirming the denial of Smith’s motion to suppress, the Supreme
Court held that Smith had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers
dialed because, as established by Miller and its predecessors, “a person has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third
parties.”132 But Smith extended this binary rule of absolute concealment to
automated transactions that are highly unlikely to ever involve a human being,
whether as a practical matter and/or because such access is contractually
disclaimed. Thus, the third-party doctrine is triggered by the disclosure of
information that occurs whenever an individual voluntarily interacts with an
automated third-party processing system,133 where there is even the faintest
possibility of human observation.134
II.

THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE IN THE DIGITAL AGE

Smith remains the Supreme Court’s most definitive statement on the
application of the third-party doctrine to electronic communications and related
technologies. Yet it was issued nearly forty years ago, at the leading edge of the
digital age. In several key respects, Smith presaged the coming transformation of
the information environment, applying the third-party doctrine to the
transmission of information by an automated system—owned and operated by a
private intermediary—that collects, processes, and stores associated data. But
the Smith Court could not have possibly imagined the speed and scale of the
coming advancements in computer and information technologies nor the
challenges these developments would present for the Court’s “modern” thirdparty doctrine. In this Section, I address two advancements in particular: the
initial shift to digitized electronic communications and the move to cloud
computing.

127. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
128. Smith, 442 U.S. at 741 (quoting United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 167
(1977)) (addressing the search and seizure of telephone numbers dialed, rather than physical
documents or contents of conversations).
129. Id. at 737.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 743–44.
133. Id. at 744–45 (declining “to hold that a different constitutional result is required because
the telephone company has decided to automate”).
134. See Tokson, Automation, supra note 12, at 600 (discussing the conflict between the
automation rationale and the human-observer theory of the third-party doctrine).
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The transition from analog to digitized electronic communication,135 such as
email,136 created a gap in privacy regulation that left personal communications
vulnerable both to interception during transmission and to retrieval from the
storage facilities of the sender, recipient, or service provider.137 Tasked by
Congress in the mid-1980s to investigate potential privacy concerns related to
these new electronic communication and surveillance technologies,138 the Office
of Technology Assessment (OTA) concluded that neither the existing statutory
protections nor judicial interpretations of the Fourth Amendment were adequate
to safeguard individual privacy interests.139 Of particular relevance here, the
OTA expressed concern that application of the third-party doctrine—holding
that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in information revealed or
voluntarily conveyed to a third party140—might well extinguish Fourth
Amendment protections for stored electronic communications.141
This led Congress to enact the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986 (ECPA),142 which extended existing statutory restrictions on the use of
traditional wiretaps to the interception of electronic data transmissions143 while
placing lesser restrictions on government access to both the content of stored
electronic communications144 and the data provided to third-party remotecomputing services for storage and processing.145 In the three decades since the
passage of the ECPA, however, these statutory protections have come under
increasing criticism.146 Law enforcement has taken advantage of a dramatic
increase in remote storage capabilities to avoid the more onerous requirements
of the ECPA’s wiretap provisions by instead “accessing stored electronic

135. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 11, at 13 (discussing the emergence of digital
communications, focusing on email and cell phones).
136. See id. at 46–47 (describing the growing popularity and commercialization of email);
Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Internet History, INT’L J. TECHNOETHICS, Apr.–June 2011, at 45, 53 (same).
Ray Tomlinson is widely credited with introducing email when he created the first “basic email
message send-and-read software” in 1972. Barry M. Leiner et al., The Past and Future History of the
Internet, COMM. ACM, Feb. 1997, at 102, 103.
137. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 11, at 48–50 (describing multiple points of email
vulnerability).
138. See id. at 3–4.
139. Id. at 10.
140. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435, 442 (1976).
141. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 11, at 50 (stating that “[e]xisting law offers
little protection” for stored communications vulnerable to interception by third parties).
142. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (current version in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
143. RICHARD M. THOMPSON II & JARED P. COLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44036, STORED
COMMUNICATIONS ACT: REFORM OF THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT (ECPA) 2
(2015).
144. Id. at 3–5.
145. Id.
146. See Orin S. Kerr, The Next Generation Communications Privacy Act, 162 U. PA. L.
REV. 373, 386–90 (2014) (discussing current criticisms of the ECPA); Raquel, supra note 19, at 490
(calling the ECPA “painfully outdated”).
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communications, such as emails, directly from a service provider.”147 In many
cases, the Stored Communications Act (SCA), which governs such access, waives
the more stringent warrant requirement in favor of a subpoena or court order,148
raising privacy concerns.149
The “cloud computing revolution”150 amplifies and extends the gap in
online privacy law protections identified by the OTA. In a typical cloud
computing system, some combination of computing resources (“e.g., networks,
servers, storage, applications, and services”) is outsourced to a third party, which
owns, manages, and operates those systems.151 Core software applications and all
associated data—whether encompassed in the communication from user to user,
or created and collected in the course of that interaction with the system—may
be maintained entirely on external facilities under the control of the provider.152
Email services provide an excellent example of this model. The Google webbased email service Gmail, for instance, operates on a cloud computing
Software-as-a-Service model.153 The email application, user’s emails, and all
associated data reside on Google’s remote servers and are accessible by the user

147. THOMPSON II & COLE, supra note 143, at 3; accord Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2701–2711 (2018).
148. THOMPSON II & COLE, supra note 143, at 3.
149. See Raquel, supra note 19, at 482–85 (describing the various circumstances and mechanisms
for compelled governmental access, providing protections that fall well short of constitutional
safeguards).
150. E.g., Timothy J. Calloway, Cloud Computing, Clickwrap Agreements, and Limitation on
Liability Clauses: A Perfect Storm?, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 163, 174 (2012) (utilizing the phrase
“cloud computing revolution”). According to the technology research firm Gartner, Inc., the total
public cloud services market—including Cloud Business Process Services (BPaaS), Cloud Application
Infrastructure Services (PaaS), Cloud Application Services (SaaS), Cloud Management and Security
Services, and Cloud System Infrastructure Services (IaaS)—brought in an estimated $153.5 billion in
revenue in 2017. Gartner Forecasts Worldwide Public Cloud Revenue To Grow 21.4 Percent in 2018,
GARTNER, INC. (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3871416 [perma.cc/V8RQK3TC]. Gartner forecasts the overall market to reach $302 billion by 2021. Id.
151. See PETER MELL & TIMOTHY GRANCE, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., SP800145, THE NIST DEFINITION OF CLOUD COMPUTING 2 (2011), http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/
800-145/SP800-145.pdf [perma.cc/V8RQ-K3TC] (noting that the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) defines cloud computing as “a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, ondemand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers,
storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal
management effort or service provider interaction”); see also RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R43015, CLOUD COMPUTING: CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PRIVACY
PROTECTIONS 1 (2013) [hereinafter THOMPSON II, CLOUD COMPUTING] (observing that cloud
computing allows users to manipulate data over the internet on a third-party computer, rather than on
their own computer).
152. See David W. Opderbeck, Encryption Policy and Law Enforcement in the Cloud, 49 CONN.
L. REV. 1657, 1671–72 (2017) (describing the cloud-based nature of most email systems, as well as the
migration of documents associated with productivity software (e.g., Word, PowerPoint, and Excel) to
cloud-based platforms).
153. Id. (reviewing the various services utilizing the SaaS model). The SaaS model is generally
designed to perform certain functions or tasks. Id. For example, with G Suite, Google offers “a set of
word processing, presentation, spreadsheet and other productivity tools.” Id. Microsoft’s Office suite
products now similarly function on a SaaS model. Id.
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via web browser or program interface. Cloud storage services, such as Dropbox,
are functionally similar.154 Dropbox utilizes user-downloaded software
applications to automatically transfer copies of a user’s documents and other
computer files to the service’s remote cloud servers.155 These files are synced
across the user’s computers and mobile devices, each interacting with the
Dropbox servers, creating multiple copies in multiple locations.156
From a Fourth Amendment perspective, cloud-computing systems share
several key characteristics. First, they are a distributed computing model with
components spread across a multitude of facilities owned and/or operated by
private third parties.157 Second, these automated third-party services are
designed to actively solicit and passively collect, store, generate, utilize, and
analyze “vast quantities of personal data.”158 Some of that data is provided by
the user and some is created as a product of system operations, with the latter
often derived from user-provided content.159 Third, this information is collected,
generated, stored, and analyzed in the context of a commercial relationship and
in furtherance of “a variety of legitimate business purposes.”160 Fourth, the rapid
growth of cloud-computing facilities allows for the wholesale migration of
computer systems and essential services to third-party providers,161 significantly
expanding both the quantity and range of information entrusted to third-party
providers.162 Finally, cloud-computing systems and associated data practices are
now nearly impossible to avoid in the course of meaningful social and economic

154. See Erik C. Shallman, Comment, Up in the Air: Clarifying Cloud Storage Protections,
19 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 49, 50 (2014) (describing Dropbox as a cloud storage service).
155. Id.
156. See id. (noting that a saved file can be accessed from any computer with internet access).
157. See Shawish & Salama, supra note 16, at 41, 63 (observing that “Cloud Computing shifts
the computation from local, individual devices to distributed, virtual, and scalable resources” and
involves “massive use of third-party services and infrastructures . . . to host important data and to
perform critical operations”)
158. Tokson, Automation, supra note 12, at 604.
159. See Jared A. Harshbarger, Cloud Computing Providers and Data Security Law: Building
Trust with United States Companies, 16 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 229, 231–32 (2011) (describing cloud-based
data storage and processing, utilizing data provided by the user, data processing by the service, and
data created through those processes).
160. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979).
161. Cloud computing services are commonly divided into three categories: Software as a
Service (SaaS), Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), and Platform as a Service (PaaS). Raquel, supra
note 19, at 473. The IaaS model, in particular, allows users to offload their entire computer
infrastructure to a flexible virtual machine that emulates a computer system, but actually resides in
enormous data centers. See Shawish & Salama, supra note 16, at 49–50. With an IaaS model, all of the
user’s software systems and associated data, including both raw data and data analytics, are generally
stored on third-party computing facilities. Id.
162. See Issacharoff & Wirshba, supra note 13, at 993 (“[T]he growth of ‘cloud storage’ subjects
significantly more private data to the third party exception.”); Raquel, supra note 19, at 469
(describing cloud computing as “a transformative computing model” that places information once held
by individuals on to “remote servers owned or operated by third parties”); see also United States v.
Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 965 (9th Cir. 2013) (“With the ubiquity of cloud computing, the
government’s reach into private data becomes even more problematic.”).
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engagement with modern daily life.163
In sharp contrast to this model of ubiquitously distributed computing and
data flows, the Fourth Amendment remains stubbornly focused on one’s ability
to conceal and control access to personal information. Information disclosed to a
third party, even an automated system with little chance of human
observation,164 generally no longer enjoys Fourth Amendment protections.165 It
is an “approach . . . ill suited to the digital age,”166 in which “the third-party
doctrine has become a greedy exception that leaves little room over for the
Fourth Amendment.”167 Congress struggles to legislate even the most targeted
exceptions,168 while courts strain to analogize the postal service of 1877169 to
modern communication via email170 or text message.171 But as Chief Justice
Roberts observed in Riley v. California,172 strained analogies often “crumble[]
entirely” when applied to cloud computing.173

163. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[P]eople
reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out
mundane tasks.”); see also Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (describing modern cell
phones as “a pervasive and insistent part of daily life”).
164. Tokson, Automation, supra note 12, at 600 (discussing the conflict between the automation
rationale and the human-observer theory of the third-party doctrine).
165. Jones, 565 U.S. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (stating that under the third-party
doctrine, “an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed
to third parties” (first citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979); then citing United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976))).
166. Id.; see also Bedi, Facebook, supra note 19, at 19–28 (reviewing various criticisms of the
Fourth Amendment and third-party doctrine); Neil Richards, The Third-Party Doctrine and the Future
of the Cloud, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1441, 1475–80 (2017) (describing the Supreme Court’s recent
recognition of the lag between privacy law and social-technical practices, including cloud computing);
Couillard, supra note 60, at 2218 (discussing both the emerging Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
regarding email and other forms of communication, as well as the difficulties of applying existing
principles to cloud computing).
167. Bryan H. Choi, For Whom the Data Tolls: A Reunified Theory of Fourth and Fifth
Amendment Jurisprudence, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 185, 217 (2015); see also Monu Bedi, Social
Networks, Government Surveillance, and the Fourth Amendment Mosaic Theory, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1809,
1814 (2014) (arguing that, “[u]nder a strict application of [third-party] doctrine,” no internet
communications “merit Fourth Amendment protection” because they “are housed in . . . proprietary
systems for various periods of time in order to facilitate the transmission”).
168. RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43586, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE 23–25 (2014) (discussing legislation intended to restore, to a certain degree,
privacy protections lost by application of the third-party doctrine).
169. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878) (prohibiting government officials from
intercepting and examining the content of sealed letters in the U.S. mail, unless they first obtain a
warrant).
170. See, e.g., United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 285–88 (6th Cir. 2010) (discussing Ex
parte Jackson). But see United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1304–05 (10th Cir. 2016) (discussing
the unsettled nature of the issue).
171. See, e.g., Love v. State, 543 S.W.3d 835, 842–45 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (discussing Ex parte
Jackson and reviewing cases analogizing text messages to the content of an envelope conveyed
through the U.S. mail).
172. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
173. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491 (defining cloud computing as “the capacity of Internet-connected
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In the absence of clear limitations on the third-party doctrine, it seems the
classic case of an exception that threatens to swallow the rule. As Eleventh
Circuit Judge Beverly Martin recently warned:
[B]lunt application of the third-party doctrine threatens to allow the
government access to a staggering amount of information that surely
must be protected under the Fourth Amendment . . . . [B]y allowing a
third-party company access to our e-mail accounts, the websites we
visit, and our search-engine history—all for legitimate business
purposes—we give up any privacy interest in that information.
And why stop there? Nearly every website collects information
about what we do when we visit. [Broad application of the third-party
doctrine] allows the government to know from YouTube.com what we
watch, or Facebook.com what we post or whom we “friend,” or
Amazon.com what we buy, or Wikipedia.com [sic] what we research,
or Match.com whom we date—all without a warrant. In fact, the
government could ask “cloud”-based file-sharing services like Dropbox
or Apple’s iCloud for all the files we relinquish to their servers. I am
convinced that most internet users would be shocked by this.174
Although there is precious little case law addressing the application of the
third-party doctrine to these networked technologies, there are certainly
indications that Judge Martin’s concerns are well founded. As Laura Donohue
has observed, the Supreme Court “has been slow to recognize a Fourth
Amendment interest in digital communications,” and “the lower courts remain
divided” on many key applications—including protections for the content of
both email and text messages.175 And as Justice Gorsuch recently observed, the
Supreme Court’s binary approach to the third-party doctrine leads to potentially
untenable results.
The problem isn’t with the [lower court’s] application of Smith and
Miller but with the cases themselves. Can the government demand a
copy of all your e-mails from Google or Microsoft without implicating
your Fourth Amendment rights? Can it secure your DNA from
23andMe without a warrant or probable cause? Smith and Miller say
yes it can—at least without running afoul of Katz. But that result
strikes most lawyers and judges today—me included—as pretty
unlikely.176
But are such results really so unlikely? In one recent case in which the
government sought “essentially . . . every posting and action . . . taken through
Facebook,”177 a New York court held that “under the Third-Party Doctrine only
a subpoena and prior notice (a much lower hurdle than probable cause) are

devices to display data stored on remote servers rather than on the device itself”). Interestingly, Chief
Justice Roberts suggested, without so deciding, that for Fourth Amendment purposes it “generally
makes little difference” whether data is stored locally or in the cloud. Id.
174. United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 535–36 (11th Cir. 2015) (Martin, J., dissenting).
175. Donohue, Digital World, supra note 1, at 651–56.
176. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2262 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
177. In re 381 Search Warrants Directed to Facebook, Inc., 14 N.Y.S.3d 23, 24 (App. Div. 2015),
aff’d 78 N.E.3d 141 (N.Y. 2017).
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needed to compel an ISP to disclose the contents of an email or of files stored on
a server.”178 To borrow the words of Judge Martin, “I am convinced that most
internet users would be shocked by this.”179
III. A PROPOSAL FOR LIMITING THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE
My proposal for limiting the reach of the third-party doctrine proceeds in
three parts. In Part III.A, I argue that our constitutional commitment to freedom
of thought is historically and properly connected to the enumeration of “papers”
as a distinct object of Fourth Amendment protection. This Part begins with an
explication of freedom of thought, primarily as an aspect of First Amendment
doctrine. I then turn to the relationship between freedom of thought and privacy
rights, including the relevance of certain core Fourth Amendment principles,
with a focus on the link between protections for personal papers and
autonomous thought.
In Part III.B, I seek to revive the connection between freedom of thought
and personal papers. I begin by exploring various models of cognition and the
role of cognitive artifacts in these processes and systems. I then explain how
papers and their digital equivalents serve as cognitive artifacts capable of
representing and storing information, and thus function as integral components
of a cognitive system performing cognitive tasks. Although conceptualized
through the lens of contemporary cognitive science, this account is consistent
with historical protections for personal papers, translating the intuition of prior
generations into current cognitive theory.
In Part III.C, I propose changes to the third-party doctrine intended to
reestablish enhanced constitutional protections for papers and their digital
equivalents when functioning as cognitive artifacts. In the emerging information
environment, these cognitive artifacts are no longer confined within protected
spaces and personal confidences but are now distributed across automated thirdparty networks that store, process, and transfer the information. Yet they remain
integral components of our cognitive processes. Indeed, there is good reason to
conclude that our ability to readily access and incorporate vast stores of
information maintained, represented, stored, and even operated upon by
cognitive artifacts—as well as, consequently, our growing reliance on these
components of information processing—has only reinforced the role of these
artifacts in human cognition. By this account, in which papers are recognized and
valued as cognitive artifacts, our constitutional commitment to freedom of
thought compels modifications to the third-party doctrine to restore certain
Fourth Amendment protections.
A.

Freedom of Thought, Privacy of Thought, and Fourth Amendment Papers
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized the central importance of

178. Id. at 21 (issue not addressed on appeal).
179. Davis, 785 F.3d at 536 (Martin, J., dissenting).
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protecting individual freedom of thought from government interference.180 It
“was first recognized by the Supreme Court in . . . 1878,” in the context of
religious belief,181 and in secular matters “by Justices Holmes and Brandeis as
part of their dissenting tradition in free speech cases in the 1910s and 1920s.”182
In 1937, Justice Cardozo referred to freedom of thought as “the matrix, the
indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.”183 In 1969,
Justice Marshall wrote that “[o]ur whole constitutional heritage rebels at the
thought of giving government the power to control men’s minds.”184 And in
2002, Justice Kennedy declared that “[t]he right to think is the beginning of
freedom.”185 Yet, despite this history, the Court has remained largely
noncommittal as to the constitutional foundations and substance of this “most
vital of our liberties.”186
Freedom of thought is most often framed by its relationship to the First
Amendment.187 Thomas Jefferson, for instance, wrote of the importance of “the
rights of thinking, and publishing our thoughts by speaking or writing.”188 In the
narrower form of this conception, freedom of thought is regarded for its
instrumental value in promoting the outwardly expressive liberties of speech,
association, assembly, and free exercise.189 In its more expansive form, freedom
of thought is imbued with the intrinsic value of individual autonomy and
integrity.190 In some respects, these different conceptions of freedom of thought
parallel differing views of First Amendment protections for free expression.
Thus, by exploring the asserted values of free expression, we gain insight into the
substance of freedom of thought.
Protections for free expression are generally justified by reference to one of
three values: promotion of democratic self-governance, the pursuit of truth, or
the preservation of individual autonomy and self-realization.191 The first of these
180. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (“The government ‘cannot
constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person’s private thoughts.’”
(quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969))); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[W]ithout freedom of thought there can be no free society.”); Doe v.
City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 777 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[F]reedom of the mind occupies a highlyprotected position in our constitutional heritage.”); Richards, Intellectual Privacy, supra note 37, at 412
(“The Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of thought
is at the foundation of what it means to be a free society.”).
181. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, supra note 37, at 410 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145 (1878)).
182. Id.
183. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326–27 (1937).
184. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
185. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002).
186. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, supra note 37, at 388–89.
187. See, e.g., id.
188. Thomas Jefferson, Letter to David Humphreys, in 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
86, 90 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1895).
189. See Kolber, supra note 41, at 1387–88.
190. See Tuchman, supra note 47, at 2280.
191. See David S. Han, Autobiographical Lies and the First Amendment’s Protection of SelfDefining Speech, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70, 89–93 (2012) (“[T]hree general rationales are most commonly
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values is distinctly instrumental in nature, presenting free expression as a
necessary condition for the realization of democratic self-governance.192 This
approach preferences both certain forms of expression (public discourse and
deliberation) and certain topics (political speech) as worthy of greater
protection.193 The second of these values justifies protections for free expression
as instrumental to the pursuit of truth194—but a sort of public truth. In this
context, free expression is valued as a necessary condition to the development
and maintenance of a “marketplace of ideas,” in which competing theories and
opinions are tested, and from which the truth is likely to emerge.195 The third
value, preservation of individual autonomy and self-realization,196 is different in
kind from these first two values. Apart from the promotion of public values such
as democratic self-governance or realization of a public truth, this account is
unmistakably focused on the individual, with derivative benefits to society at
large. Free expression is instrumentally valued as “an integral part of the
development of ideas, of mental exploration and of the affirmation of self,”197
fostering “individual self-realization and self-determination”198—a personal
truth. These instrumental values are closely tied to the intrinsic value of free
expression as “an essential attribute of individual personhood.”199 Thus, speech
“receive[s] constitutional protection (at least in part) as [an] embodiment[] of
collective respect for individual liberty or autonomy.”200
Freedom of thought implicates many of these same concerns as to
justification, value, and substance. Adam Kolber, for instance, began with what
he referred to as a distinction between the “intertwined” and “independent”
views of freedom of thought.201 Specifically, he asked “whether the First
Amendment protects thought itself . . . or only protects thought when it is linked
to expression.”202 Under the intertwined view, “freedom of thought holds only
instrumental value from a First Amendment perspective . . . as a way of

advanced as bases for the First Amendment’s protection of free speech: the pursuit of truth, the
promotion of democratic self-government, and the preservation of individual autonomy and selfrealization.”).
192. See id. at 91; see also Leora Harpaz, Justice Jackson’s Flag Salute Legacy: The Supreme
Court Struggles To Protect Intellectual Individualism, 64 TEX. L. REV. 817, 826 n.34 (1986) (citing
various adherents to the instrumental and intrinsic theories of the First Amendment).
193. See Han, supra note 191, at 91.
194. Id. at 90.
195. Id. (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
196. Id. at 92–93.
197. Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877,
879 (1963).
198. C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964,
966 (1978).
199. See Han, supra note 191, at 92.
200. C. Edwin Baker, Private Power, the Press, and the Constitution, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 421,
436 (1993).
201. Kolber, supra note 41, at 1383.
202. Id.

80

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

promoting expression.”203 In an absence of “a connection to expression,”
“freedom of thought holds only modest value.”204 This narrow focus on the
instrumental value of freedom of thought has the benefit of reinforcing
consistency with theories of free expression, but it potentially suffers from the
implicit limitations of those views (e.g., public discourse and deliberation, the
search for a public truth, and elevated protections for political speech). The
independent view, on the other hand, “protects freedom of thought even in cases
that lack recognized forms of expression.”205 Kolber recognized two potential
supporting theories for this view. The first is simply that the First Amendment
“values thought separately from expression.”206 The second is that, even if
“thought is only instrumentally valuable from a First Amendment
perspective[,] . . . the connection between thought and expression [is] so close
and important that we need not find expression in any particular case.”207
Until recently, these contested accounts of freedom of thought have
generally eluded resolution because resolution has never been required.208 The
purely internal workings of our minds are locked within flesh and bone, beyond
penetration and without the need for legal protections.209 As Marc Jonathan
Blitz has observed, freedom of thought has been invoked “not as a means for
protecting our already protected internal mental freedom, but rather as a
justification for shielding certain external actions . . . that many view as having a
close connection to, or providing indispensable support for, our capacity to think
freely and autonomously.”210
The Supreme Court, for example, has invoked freedom of thought in
cases barring the government from penalizing us for joining, or
refusing to join, certain political groups, for refusing to affirm certain
government-mandated messages or commitments (in loyalty oaths, flag
salutes, or license plates), or for watching an obscene film in our own
home. All of these activities are performed in the external world, not in
the realm of pure fantasy or imagination. But the Court held that
punishing them was tantamount to punishing thought.211
Freedom of thought has thus been protected from external sources of
government interference with respect to the information we receive, disseminate,
adopt, and discuss with nongovernmental actors. Likewise, the government may
act to preserve freedom of thought from excessive external interference by
others. As Justice Frankfurter observed in Kovacs v. Cooper,212 the legislature

203. Id. at 1386.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1386–87.
206. Id. at 1387.
207. Id.
208. See Blitz, Intellectual Privacy, supra note 42, at 15.
209. See id. (“[W]e hardly need constitutional protection, or any other type of legal wall, to
insulate an activity—like purely mental activity—that is already fully insulated by nature.”).
210. Id. (footnote omitted).
211. Id. at 15–16 (footnotes omitted).
212. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
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may impose reasonable restrictions intended to “safeguard[] the steadily
narrowing opportunities for serenity and reflection[, for] [w]ithout such
opportunities freedom of thought becomes a mocking phrase, and without
freedom of thought there can be no free society.”213
This focus on external interference underscores the importance of
distinguishing between the object of protection and the conditions necessary for
its protection. Seana Shiffrin, for instance, identified the object of protection as
“the process by which ideas and expressions are generated, nurtured, and
mooted, both in individuals and within groups.”214 Shiffrin then described the
conditions necessary to realize this value:
The autonomous agent must have some ability to control what
influences she is exposed to, to what subjects she directs her mind, and
whether she, at all times, directs her mind toward anything at all or
instead “spaces out” and allows the mind to relax and wander. To
function as an independent thinker and evaluator, the individual must
have domains in which she may enjoy the privacy of her thoughts.215
Thus, just as “individual freedom of thought is a clear requisite for meaningful
freedom of speech protections,”216 so too is privacy of thought regarded as a
necessary condition for freedom of thought.217
Neil Richards similarly observed that “the development of ideas and beliefs
often takes place best in solitary contemplation or collaboration with a few
trusted confidants,”218 systematizing many of these various threads under a
theory of what he terms “intellectual privacy.”219
Intellectual privacy is the ability, whether protected by law or social
circumstances, to develop ideas and beliefs away from the unwanted
gaze or interference of others . . . . The ability to freely make up our
minds and to develop new ideas thus depends upon a substantial
measure of intellectual privacy. In this way, intellectual privacy is a
cornerstone of meaningful First Amendment liberties.220
Richards described intellectual privacy as consisting of four elements: “the
213. Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 97 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
214. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, What Is Really Wrong with Compelled Association?, 99 NW. U. L.
REV. 839, 873 (2005).
215. Id. at 875.
216. Id. at 874.
217. See, e.g., Richards, Intellectual Privacy, supra note 37, at 425 (drawing the link between
intellectual privacy and cognitive processes).
218. Id. at 389.
219. Id.
220. Id. Richards also wrote that intellectual privacy
nurtures the cognitive and communicative processes by which we as individuals can come to
think for ourselves. It allows us to imagine, test, and develop our ideas free from the
deterring gaze or interfering actions of others. Without intellectual privacy, we would be
less willing to investigate ideas and hypotheses that might turn out to be wrong,
controversial, or deviant. Intellectual privacy thus permits us to experiment with ideas in
relative seclusion without having to disclose them before we have developed them,
considered them, and decided whether to adopt them as our own.
Id. at 425.
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freedom of thought and belief, spatial privacy, the freedom of intellectual
exploration, and the confidentiality of communication.”221 Freedom of thought
and belief is “the precondition for all other political and religious rights.”222 It
“protects our ability to hold beliefs”223 by safeguarding “the individual’s
thoughts from scrutiny or unwilling disclosure.”224 Spatial privacy “refers to the
protection of places—physical, social, or otherwise—against intrusion or
surveillance,” which “allow[s] us to think freely and without interference.”225
Freedom of intellectual exploration protects the individual’s ability to develop
new ideas and discover new truths by preserving our “right to receive, read, and
engage with information in private.”226 Finally, confidentiality of communication
“protects the relationships in which information is shared, allowing candid
discussion away from the prying ears of others. It allows us to share our
questions and tentative conclusions with confidence that our thoughts will not be
made public until we are ready.”227
Richards’s conception of intellectual privacy prioritized the protection of
autonomous thought processes, including the ability to think freely and without
interference, to develop new ideas and discover new truths, and to vet our
thoughts with close confidants. The preservation of autonomous thought in turn
requires that we protect our right to receive, read, and engage with information;
limit external scrutiny of our thought processes, including the maintenance of
private spaces free from outside interference; safeguard our thoughts from the
threat of unwilling disclosure; and protect those confidential communications
through which we test and refine our thoughts, ideas, and beliefs.228 Thus,
Richards made explicit the connection between freedom of thought (as an
element of First Amendment theory) and certain forms of privacy protection.229
He argued “that a meaningful measure of privacy is critical to the most basic
operations of expression, because it gives new ideas the room they need to
grow.”230 Justice Brandeis recognized this connection in his famous dissent in
Olmstead, tying freedom of thought to core Fourth Amendment concerns.231
“The makers of our Constitution,” Brandeis wrote, “sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations,”
free from “unjustifiable intrusion by the Government . . . [in] violation of the
Fourth Amendment.”232 Richards likewise invoked familiar Fourth Amendment

221. Id. at 392.
222. Id. at 408.
223. Id. at 416.
224. Id. at 408.
225. Id. at 412–13.
226. Id. at 417.
227. Id. at 421.
228. See id. at 392–421.
229. Id. at 392.
230. Id.
231. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471–85 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting),
overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
232. Id. at 478.
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safeguards against intrusive surveillance, with specific protections shaped by
reference to the First Amendment values sought to be preserved233—be it
promoting democratic self-governance, truth-seeking, or preserving individual
autonomy and self-realization.234
This connection between freedom of thought and core Fourth Amendment
principles can be traced to influences predating the Revolution. It was a view
drawn from both the English and the colonial experiences. In England, Chief
Justice Charles Pratt235 presided over two landmark cases challenging the
Crown’s use of general warrants to search and seize personal papers, and in both,
Pratt affirmed the status of personal papers as a unique and invaluable form of
property.236 In Entick v. Carrington,237 Pratt distinguished personal papers as a
man’s “dearest property . . . so far from enduring a seizure, that they will hardly
bear an inspection.”238 And in Wilkes v. Wood,239 personal papers were
described as the “promulgation of our most private concerns” and as “affairs of
the most secret personal nature,” the seizure of which perpetrates a harm for
which almost “no reparation whatsoever could be made.”240 As one member of
the House of Commons commented in parliamentary debates associated with
these cases, personal papers are “often dearer to a man than his heart’s
blood.”241 These events were closely followed in the colonies, which “absorbed
the message of the separate iniquity of seizing papers [and] carried Entick into
American law.”242
In The Original Fourth Amendment, Laura Donohue described in brilliant
detail how “these judicial challenges—and the legal treatises on which they were
based—were to profoundly shape the Founding Fathers’ introduction and
understanding of the Fourth Amendment.”243 Even before the ratification of a
Federal Constitution and Bill of Rights, “the newly formed American states

233. See, e.g., Richards, Intellectual Privacy, supra note 37, at 431–44 (providing four practical
examples of “ways in which the collection and use of personal information about intellectual activities
can threaten First Amendment values”).
234. See, e.g., id. at 407, 431–44 (arguing that “no matter which theory we proffer for why we
protect speaking and writing, freedom of thought is essential to that theory”).
235. See generally Charles Pratt, 46 DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 285–88 (Sidney
Lee ed., 1896).
236. Entick v. Carrington (1765) 19 How. St. Tr. 1029; Wilkes v. Wood (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489.
237. (1765) 19 How. St. Tr. 1029.
238. Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1066.
239. (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489.
240. Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 490.
241. See 16 Parl. Hist. Eng. HC (1795) 6, 10.
242. Dripps, supra note 3, at 83.
243. Donohue, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 32, at 1199; see also Carpenter v. United
States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (“The Founding generation crafted the Fourth Amendment as a
‘response to the reviled “general warrants” and “writs of assistance” of the colonial era, which allowed
British officers to rummage through homes in an unrestrained search for evidence of criminal
activity.’” (quoting Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014))); id. at 2251 (Alito, J., dissenting)
(quoting affirmatively from the same passage of Riley).
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objected to the use of promiscuous search and seizure.”244 Utilizing fairly
consistent language, early state constitutions provided express protection for
papers, as distinct from other personal property (i.e., effects).245 Likewise, during
ratification of the Federal Constitution, various commentators and several state
conventions proposed the addition of analogous provisions.246 This carried
through to the final, now familiar, language of the Fourth Amendment,
identifying “persons, houses, papers, and effects” as related but discrete areas of
concern.247 In its earliest decisions interpreting and applying this text, the
Supreme Court returned to the English cases and colonial experience,
acknowledging their profound influence on the framing of the Fourth
Amendment. In Boyd v. United States,248 for instance, Justice Bradley wrote of
Entick and the surrounding turmoil:
As every American statesmen, during our revolutionary and
formative period as a nation, was undoubtedly familiar with this
monument of English freedom, and considered it as the true and
ultimate expression of constitutional law, it may be confidently
asserted that its propositions were in the minds of those who framed
the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, and were considered as
sufficiently explanatory of what was meant by unreasonable searches
and seizures.249
And it was in Boyd that the Court affirmed the special status of “a man’s private
books and papers.”250
The Boyd Court recognized two constitutional grounds for this expansive,
almost absolute protection.251 The Fourth Amendment protected personal
papers as a subset of personal property more generally, severely restricting
governmental trespass absent a sufficient competing interest in that property
beyond mere evidence of a crime.252 Buttressing these protections were those
provided by the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, which
shielded papers that were testimonial in nature.253 Working in tandem—such

244. Donohue, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 32, at 1264.
245. Id. at 1264–69 (discussing the various state provisions).
246. See id. at 1283–93 (describing efforts by various states engaged in the ratification process to
guarantee protection against unreasonable search and seizure by incorporation in a Bill of Rights).
247. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
248. 116 U.S. 616 (1886), overruled by Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
249. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 626–27.
250. Id. at 623.
251. See id. at 633, 635 (recognizing that “the ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ condemned
in the Fourth Amendment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give
evidence against himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth Amendment,” and arguing
that these “constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally
construed”).
252. See id. at 633; see also Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 308–11 (1921) (finding a
Fourth Amendment violation where a warrant was used to seize the defendants’ papers, which were
later used at trial), abrogated by Hayden, 387 U.S. 294.
253. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633; see also Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 71 (1906) (observing that
seizing private papers may not be substantially different from compelling the defendant to be a witness
against himself).
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that they “r[a]n almost into each other”254—the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
thus afforded almost categorical protection against the search, seizure, and
evidentiary use of personal papers by government officials.
Unfortunately, these exceptional protections for personal papers proved too
fragile to survive intact. In Warden v. Hayden,255 the Court eliminated the mere
evidence rule256 and with it the claim to heightened protection for papers under
the Fourth Amendment.257 And in Andresen v. Maryland,258 the Court found no
violation of the Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination
where the target of a search warrant was not required to prepare, produce, or
authenticate the papers in question.259 In less than ten years, the Court
essentially eliminated the exceptional constitutional protections for personal
papers.
After Hayden and Andresen, personal papers were no longer to be uniquely
valued as constituent elements of the inner workings of the mind but as mere
objects, regressing to just another form of chattel. The conveyance of documents
through and to third parties might have presented a challenge to this ordinary
property-based approach, but the secrecy-based rule of Ex parte Jackson260
allowed the Court to avoid any inconsistency.261 When the Court moved away
from an explicitly property-based approach in Katz, adopting instead the
expectation-of-privacy test,262 questions regarding the special status of papers
might well have reemerged. Instead the Court defaulted to familiar binaries (e.g.,
private versus public, secrecy versus disclosure) that again superseded questions
regarding privacy protections for papers qua papers. As a matter of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, the link between freedom of thought, the Fourth
Amendment, and the enumeration of “papers” as a distinct object of protection
was effectively obscured.

254. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630.
255. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
256. Hayden, 387 U.S. at 300–02, 310. Under the mere evidence rule, a search warrant
authorized law enforcement to search and seize “the instrumentalities of the crime (such as a murder
weapon) or the fruits of the crime (such as stolen goods)” but not “items that have evidentiary value
only (such as incriminating documents).” Mere-Evidence Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note
32.
257. Although leaving the question open in Hayden, the Court expressly extended its rejection
of the mere evidence rule to personal papers in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976). There,
the Court stated that, “[t]o the extent . . . that the rule against compelling production of private papers
rested on the proposition that seizures of or subpoenas for ‘mere evidence,’ including documents,
violated the Fourth Amendment . . . the foundations for the rule have been washed away.” Fisher, 425
U.S. at 409.
258. 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
259. Andresen, 427 U.S. at 472–73. In Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973), the Court
held that the right against self-incrimination is personal and therefore does not apply to papers
provided to a third party. Couch, 409 U.S. at 326–27.
260. 96 U.S. 727 (1878).
261. Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733.
262. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that an
intrusion into an individual’s “constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy” could
“constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment”).

86

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

Current Supreme Court jurisprudence reflects both the asserted historical
commitment to the protection of personal papers and the Court’s failure to
articulate either a consistent supporting theory or sufficient guidance as to the
reach of any such safeguards. Writing for the majority in Carpenter v. United
States,263 Chief Justice Roberts suggested that a blanket rule permitting the
warrantless search of “any personal information reduced to document form”—
including “private letters”—would be untenable.264 Yet Roberts provided no
explicit rationale for excepting this particular class of papers from the traditional
rule of the third-party doctrine. In that same case, several of the dissenting
Justices likewise recognized that personal papers likely enjoy a special status
under Fourth Amendment doctrine but conditioned that enhanced protection on
an individual’s property interest in those papers—characterizing their possession
by a third party as a bailment.265 Chief Justice Roberts agreed that an exception
for the “modern-day equivalents” of personal papers would be “sensible” but
invoked the “reasonable expectation of privacy” standard rather than the
dissenters’ property rationale.266
In the parts that follow, I propose both an animating rationale for
protecting personal papers and guidelines for determining those circumstances
justifying an exception to the third-party doctrine.
B.

Cognitive Processes and Cognitive Artifacts

In this Part, I turn to cognitive science to demonstrate how our
constitutional commitment to freedom of thought is threatened by the failure to
provide adequate Fourth Amendment protections for information stored on
third-party computer systems. Cognitive science refers to “the interdisciplinary
study of mind and intelligence, embracing philosophy, psychology, artificial
intelligence, neuroscience, linguistics, and anthropology.”267 I begin by exploring
the four principal models of human cognition that have emerged within cognitive

263. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
264. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2222.
265. Id. at 2230 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Miller and Smith may not apply when the
Government obtains modern-day equivalents of an individual’s own ‘papers’ or ‘effects,’ even when
those papers or effects are held by a third party.” (first citing Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733; then citing
United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 283–88 (6th Cir. 2010))); id. at 2259 n.6 (Alito, J., dissenting)
(declining to answer whether the warrant requirement applies to “case[s] in which someone has
entrusted papers he or she owns to the safekeeping of another,” and/or to cases involving a bailment);
id. at 2269 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Just because you entrust your data—in some cases, your
modern-day papers and effects—to a third party may not mean you lose any Fourth Amendment
interest in its contents.”).
266. Id. at 2222 (majority opinion).
267. Paul Thagard, Cognitive Science, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (July 11, 2014),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cognitive-science/ [https://perma.cc/88X3-7TBK]; see also WORLD
TECH. EVALUATION CTR., CONVERGENCE OF KNOWLEDGE, TECHNOLOGY, AND SOCIETY 429 (Mihail
C. Roco et al., eds., 2013) (defining cognitive science as “[r]igorous research on animal and human
mental functions, based on the convergence of previously separate sciences, notably cognitive
psychology and neuroscience, but also including artificial intelligence and some branches of
anthropology, philosophy, and education”).
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science, including the traditional internalist view and three variations of situated
cognition theory (embodied cognition, embedded cognition, and
extended/distributed cognition).268 I then examine the role of cognitive artifacts
within these models.
Cognitive artifacts are devices through and by which humans “extend
cognitive abilities, such as abstract thought, memory, problem solving, and
language use.”269 This baseline theory of human cognition supports the intuitive
sense of the Framers that autonomous thought requires privacy of thought and
that personal papers are often key to the development of ideas and beliefs. More
specifically, the enumeration of “papers” as a distinct object of Fourth
Amendment protection reflects an understanding (whether explicit or
instinctive) that humans employ personal papers as cognitive artifacts integral to
our cognitive processes. Maintaining freedom of thought therefore requires that
personal papers be safeguarded against government interference. But these
cognitive models do something more. They provide a conceptual structure not
only to explain enhanced privacy protections for personal papers but also to
justify an exception to the third-party doctrine that extends these enhanced
protections to certain information stored on third-party computer systems.
Cognitive psychologist Ulric Neisser defined cognition as “all the processes
by which . . . sensory input is transformed, reduced, elaborated, stored,
recovered, and used.”270 But how are these intellectual processes carried out?
“The central hypothesis of cognitive science is that [human cognitive processes]
can best be understood in terms of [(a)] representational structures in the mind
and [(b)] computational procedures that operate on those structures.”271 It is an
approach that evolved from the development of modern logic and computing272

268. Paul Smart et al., The Cognitive Ecology of the Internet, in COGNITION BEYOND THE BRAIN
251, 256 (Stephen J. Cowley & Frédéric Vallée-Tourangeau eds., 2d ed. 2017) (noting the shift away
from the traditional view and towards situated theories over the past twenty to thirty years).
269. Philip Brey, Theories of Technology as Extension of Human Faculties, in 19 RESEARCH IN
PHILOSOPHY AND TECHNOLOGY 59, 75 (Carl Mitcham ed., 2000).
270. ULRIC NEISSER, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 4 (1967).
271. Thagard, supra note 267.
272. See W. Bechtel et al., Cognitive Science: History, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 2154, 2155 (Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes eds., 1st ed.
2001). Bechtel et al. offer the following reflection on those early influences:
One of the central inspirations for cognitive science was the development of
computational models of cognitive performance, which bring together two ideas. First,
conceiving of thought as computation was an offshoot of the development of modern logic.
In his 1854 book, The Laws of Thought, the British mathematician George Boole
demonstrated that formal operations performed on sets corresponded to logical operators
(and, or, not) applied to propositions; Boole proposed that these could serve as laws of
thought. Second, conceiving of computers as devices for computation can be traced back to
Charles Babbage’s plans in the 1840s for an ‘analytical engine’ and his collaboration with
Lady Lovelace (Ada Augusta Byron) in developing ideas for programming the device. These
ideas gained new life in the 1930s and 1940s with the development of automata theory
(especially the Turing machine), cybernetics (centered on Norbert Weiner’s feedback loops),
designs for implementing Boolean operations via electric on/off switches (Claude Shannon),
and information theory (also Shannon). Implementation became possible with the invention
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and continues to draw on these foundations:
Most work in cognitive science assumes that the mind has mental
representations analogous to computer data structures, and
computational procedures similar to computational algorithms.
Cognitive theorists have proposed that the mind contains such mental
representations as logical propositions, rules, concepts, images, and
analogies, and that it uses mental procedures such as deduction, search,
matching, rotating, and retrieval.273
Utilizing these basic elements of mental representation and computational
procedure, cognitive science theorizes functional models of information
processing––perception, attention, language, memory, and thought.
In constructing these functional models, some of the most basic and
contested questions revolve around the structure of the cognitive system in
which these processes occur. Broadly speaking, two models of cognitive
processing and cognitive systems have emerged. The traditional internalist view is
of the mind as “an abstract information processor,”274 conceptually distinct from
the corporeal body,275 with “[p]erceptual and motor systems . . . serv[ing] merely
as peripheral input and output devices.”276 Situated cognition theory, on the other
hand, shifts away from focusing on “cognitive processes realized in the brain
[and] towards cognitive processes involving brain, body, and the
environment.”277 This broad theory can be roughly divided into three distinct but
related theses:
First, the embodied cognition thesis, which claims that cognition
depends on, and is sometimes constituted by, the human body. Second,
the embedded cognition thesis, which claims that our cognitive
processes are sometimes shaped but not constituted by bio-external
resources. Third, the [extended cognition thesis], which claim[s] that
cognitive states and processes, under certain conditions, are distributed
across embodied agents and cognitive artifacts or other bio-external
resources.278
As these descriptions suggest, key points of differentiation between these various
theses include the locus of cognition and the role of bioexternal resources
(including cognitive artifacts) in cognitive systems and processes.
of electrical circuits, vacuum tubes, and transistors and was put on a fast track by World War
II . . . .
Id.
273. Thagard, supra note 267.
274. Margaret Wilson, Six Views of Embodied Cognition, 9 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 625,
625 (2002).
275. See Brey, Human-Computer Interaction, supra note 56, at 388 (“Traditionally, cognitive
scientists have located information processing tasks in the head; information processing, or cognition,
is thought to be done by minds, and minds alone.”); Robert A. Wilson & Lucia Foglia, Embodied
Cognition, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Dec. 8, 2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/embodiedcognition/ [https://perma.cc/D3HD-E28A].
276. Wilson, supra note 274, at 625.
277. Smart et al., supra note 268, at 256.
278. Id. (emphases added) (citations omitted). “Some theorists take these three approaches as a
package deal, whereas others defend only one of these approaches.” Id.
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Proponents of embodied cognition claim that “aspects of the agent’s body
beyond the brain play a significant causal or physically constitutive role in
cognitive processing,”279 and thus “that the mind must be understood in the
context of its relationship to a physical body that interacts with the world.”280 We
can distinguish between the “weak” and “strong” forms of embodied cognition
by reference to the nature and degree of integration between mind and body.
“Weak embodied cognition claims that human cognitive processes sometimes
depend on and are shaped by the body but are not constituted by it. Strong
embodied cognition, on the other hand, claims that cognition is partly
constituted by the body.”281 In either case, bioexternal resources play no
constitutive role in human cognitive processes.282
Building on the distinction between the weak and strong forms of embodied
cognition, it is helpful to generalize the key point of differentiation as between
(a) those resources that merely aid cognition283 and (b) those resources that are
constitutive of a cognitive process or system.284 Note that in applying this
distinction to the embodied cognition thesis, the relevant resource to be
considered is the physical body in its relation to the mind.285 Embedded
cognition and extended cognition move beyond the mind-body conception to
consider whether artifacts and other external resources merely aid our cognitive
processes or may function as constitutive elements of certain cognitive processes
residing in a cognitive system.286 Embedded cognition generally treats these
external resources as aids to cognition (e.g., scaffolding).287 Extended cognition,
on the other hand, recognizes that external resources may be “potentially
integrated deeply into the cognitive processes of their users, thereby extending
their cognitive processes” as constitutive elements of that system.288 Although
there is significant variation in the precise contours of this approach, at the
approach’s fullest is “the claim that new layers of non-biological scaffolding
(pens, papers, software packages and the like) might literally become
incorporated into the very mechanisms of (some kinds of) human thought.”289
In considering the role of external resources within these processes and
systems, we pay particular attention to cognitive artifacts. An artifact is generally
defined as “a physical object intentionally designed, made, and used for a
particular purpose.”290 Cognitive artifacts, generally speaking, are a specific type

279. Wilson & Foglia, supra note 275.
280. Wilson, supra note 274, at 625.
281. Smart et al., supra note 268, at 257.
282. See id.
283. Id. at 259–60.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 263.
286. Id. at 259–60, 269–70.
287. Id. at 259–60.
288. See id. at 259.
289. Collins, Clark & Shrager, supra note 55, at 361 (Clark’s “The Blind Carpenter: A Reply to
Harry Collins”).
290. Richard Heersmink, A Taxonomy of Cognitive Artifacts: Function, Information, and
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of artifact, the purpose of which is to aid, enhance, or improve cognition.291
Philosophy and technology scholar Robert Clowes offered this definition:
Provisionally and pragmatically . . . we shall define cognitive artefacts
as artificial devices which either perform functions that, were they
carried out in the brain should count as cognitive, or significantly
support, extend or complement such functions . . . . At this stage, we
need not defend a strong position on whether cognitive technologies
can become actual parts of our minds, and thus extend our minds, as
the thesis of the extended mind contends, or merely act as a new sort of
environment, niche or scaffold in which our minds operate. We merely
hold that we, and our minds, have undergone profound changes, as we
create and adopt new cognitive technologies.292
Psychologist Donald Norman, who is widely credited with introducing the
concept, defined cognitive artifacts as “artificial devices that maintain, display, or
operate upon information in order to serve a representational function and that
affect human cognitive performance.”293 Expanding on the functional aspect,
Philip Brey identified the ability of a cognitive artifact “to represent, store,
retrieve and manipulate information,”294 while Nancy J. Nersessian emphasized
“the cognitive properties of generating, manipulating, or propagating
representations.”295 As Richard Heersmink observed, these definitions have
three elements in common: “cognitive artifacts are defined as (a) human-made,
physical objects” that (b) “provide (and sometimes manipulate or process)
representational information,” and (c) “are deployed by human agents for the
purpose of functionally contributing to performing a cognitive task.”296
According to Heersmink, it is the last of these elements that is the “most
distinctive property” of a cognitive artifact.297 Brey echoed this point, remarking
that a “distinguishing feature of cognitive artifacts is that they do not just
Categories, 4 REV. PHIL. PSYCHOL. 465, 468 (2013) [hereinafter Heersmink, Taxonomy]; see also Beth
Preston, Artifact, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (July 18, 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
artifact/ [https://perma.cc/85DF-HWWM] (“[A]rtifacts are objects made intentionally, in order to
accomplish some purpose.”).
291. Heersmink, Taxonomy, supra note 290, at 467–68 (discussing EDWIN HUTCHINS,
COGNITION IN THE WILD 172 (1995)).
292. Robert Clowes, Thinking in the Cloud: The Cognitive Incorporation of Cloud-Based
Technology, 28 PHIL. & TECH. 261, 264 (2015) (citations omitted).
293. Norman, supra note 58, at 17. Common examples include “a string tied around the finger as
a reminder, a calendar, a shopping list, and a computer.” Hutchins, Cognitive Artifacts, supra note 57,
at 126.
294. Brey, Human-Computer Interaction, supra note 56, at 385.
295. Nancy J. Nersessian, Interpreting Scientific and Engineering Practices: Integrating the
Cognitive, Social, and Cultural Dimensions, in SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL THINKING 17, 42
(Michael E. Gorman et al. eds., 2005).
296. Heersmink, Taxonomy, supra note 290, at 471. Although Heersmink defined cognitive
artifacts as physical objects, Norman allowed that “cognitive artifacts . . . [may] include mental as well
as material elements.” Hutchins, Cognitive Artifacts, supra note 57, at 126 (citing DONALD A.
NORMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY THINGS (1987)) (“Rules of thumb, proverbs, mnemonics,
and memorized procedures are clearly artifactual and play a similar role to objects in some cognitive
processes.”).
297. Heersmink, Taxonomy, supra note 290, at 471.
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function as objects of cognition, like other structure [sic] in the world, but that
they become integral components of the information processing task itself.”298
Focusing on these last two points, there is a certain amount of disagreement
inherent in the various models of human cognition regarding both the precise
manner in which cognitive artifacts contribute to the performance of a cognitive
task and the degree to which cognitive artifacts are integrated into the cognitive
process itself. For purposes of this Article, a few examples will suffice. Edwin
Hutchins posited that “[c]ognitive artifacts are involved in a process of
organizing functional skills into functional systems” and thereby “produce
cognitive effects by bringing functional skills into coordination with various
kinds of structure.”299 Heersmink argued:
The informational properties and functionalities of [cognitive] artefacts
are crucial for performing a wide range of cognitive tasks, including
navigating, calculating, planning, remembering, decision-making, and
reasoning . . . . The function of cognitive artefacts . . . is to provide taskrelevant information, thereby complementing internal storage and
processing systems and making certain cognitive tasks easier, faster,
more reliable, or possible at all. A map, for example, is a cognitive
artefact because its function is to provide task-relevant information
used for navigating.300
Thus, “cognitive function [may be characterized] as an emergent property of the
interaction between intentional, embodied agents, and cognitive artefacts.”301
In an effort to more clearly illustrate the relationship between cognitive
artifacts and the cognitive tasks for which they are employed, I will closely
examine one such task: memory. Most people are all too aware of our increasing
reliance on digital devices and internet access.302 Most apparently, this
interdependence evidences our desire for connecting—linking together
individuals and organizations, whether synchronously or asynchronously, at
virtually any time and from any place. But it also reflects our growing appetite
for access to information—both the information that we ourselves create and
information available from other known and unknown sources. Our ubiquitous
smartphones are themselves a powerful example, with processing speeds and
self-contained data storage capabilities303 that were almost unimaginable just
years earlier. A variety of native applications—software residing on and running

298. Brey, Human-Computer Interaction, supra note 56, at 388.
299. Hutchins, Cognitive Artifacts, supra note 57, at 127.
300. Richard Heersmink, The Metaphysics of Cognitive Artefacts, 19 PHIL. EXPLORATIONS 78,
78–79 (2016) [hereinafter Heersmink, Metaphysics] (citations omitted).
301. Id. at 85. So, for instance, if the representation structure of a cognitive artifact contains
information that is task relevant, this information is perceived and then processed by internal systems.
See id. at 78–85.
302. See Betsy Sparrow et al., Google Effects on Memory: Cognitive Consequences of Having
Information at Our Fingertips, 333 SCIENCE 776–78 (2011) (presenting a study on the effects of digital
devices and the internet).
303. For example, in 2014 the 4.9-ounce iPhone 4S offered up to 64 GB of capacity, with both
cellular and wireless capabilities. iPhone 4S—Technical Specifications, APPLE.COM (Aug. 15, 2014),
https://support.apple.com/kb/sp643?locale=en_US [https://perma.cc/EM3T-FQPN].
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in the smartphone environment—allow the user to easily create, modify,
organize, and access this locally stored data.304 Other applications perform these
and other data functions without the involvement and/or knowledge of the
user.305 Of course, these same devices also provide network access through web
browsers (e.g., Safari or Chrome), email clients (e.g., Outlook or Apple’s Mail),
and remote storage applications (e.g., Dropbox or Google Drive). Through the
network, users gain access to an almost inconceivable amount of remotely stored
data, as well as network-based applications providing data creation,
modification, organization, and access functions similar to those provided by
native applications.
One phenomenon of this environment—where the amount of available data
is so great, and where that data is easily created, stored, organized, and
accessed—is what has been called memory offloading.306 “Inundated by more
information than we can possibly hold in our heads, we’re increasingly handing
off the job of remembering” to our devices and network-based applications.307
This offloaded memory usually takes two forms. The first form can be broadly
thought of as generalized information about our individual lives. Rather than
remembering phone numbers and addresses, we store them in our contacts
database. Events are calendared electronically and forgotten until the reminder
pops up on our phone. Facts contained in correspondence are stored in
searchable email archives. Meeting notes are drafted and stored on a remote
access server. The second form is generalized information about the world at
large. What is the capital of Panama? What is the difference between spiders and
insects? What is the square root of 196? Who wrote the poem “Ode to
Autumn”? Rather than committing these facts to memory, we turn to Google.
And, having looked them up once, “[w]e don’t even have to remember the
answers—we can just look them up again.”308
This phenomenon has been described as a process in which “[w]e are
becoming symbiotic with our computer tools.”309 Or, in the words of
304. See Hybrid vs Native Mobile Apps—The Answer Is Clear, Y MEDIA LABS, https://
ymedialabs.com/hybrid-vs-native-mobile-apps-the-answer-is-clear
[https://perma.cc/V7CA-3GXY]
(last visited Oct. 18, 2018) (“[N]ative applications have the significant advantage of being able to easily
access and utilize the built-in capabilities of the user’s device . . . .”).
305. See, e.g., Lauren Goode, App Permissions Don’t Tell Us Nearly Enough About Our Apps,
WIRED (Apr. 14, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/app-permissions/ [https://perma.cc/
2EL3-5JWD]; see also Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014) (“Cell phone users often may
not know whether particular information is stored on the device or in the cloud . . . .”).
306. John F. Nestojko et al., Extending Cognition to External Agents, 24 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 321,
321 (2013) (“Humans have tried to offload memory tasks for as long as we have recorded history . . . .
The issue is how the Internet has accelerated and changed the process.”).
307. Annie Murphy Paul, Your Head Is in the Cloud, TIME (Mar. 12, 2012),
http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,2108040-1,00.html
[https://perma.cc/Q23AGE75].
308. Ed Yong, The Extended Mind—How Google Affects Our Memories, DISCOVER: NOT
EXACTLY ROCKET SCIENCE (July 14, 2011, 2:00 PM), http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/
notrocketscience/2011/07/14/the-extended-mind-how-google-affects-our-memories/#.W56q9ZNKhTY
[https://perma.cc/9SQ6-AVAC].
309. Paul, supra note 307; see also Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018)
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anthropologist Amber Case, “We are all cyborgs now.”310 The metaphor is, in
many respects, rather appropriate. Drawing on a definition from 1960s space
exploration, Case defined a cyborg as “an organism to which exogenous
components have been added for the purpose of adapting to new
environments.”311 In this case, that new environment is one in which the amount
of information both readily available to and thrust upon the individual is beyond
the capacity of our organic brains.312 We therefore outsource certain memory
tasks to “exogenous components” such as smartphones, through which we
create, modify, organize, and access information distributed across vast remote
networks.313 It is a deepening symbiotic relationship between users and
computers that appears to be evolving toward an interconnected system—a
system in which we “remember less by knowing information than by knowing
where the information can be found.”314 As we offload memory to digital devices
and networks, “forgetting” the substantive information, we are getting better at
remembering where the information is and/or how to find it.315
A simple example reframes the process of memory offloading to illustrate
how cognitive artifacts are deployed in the new information environment. As
described previously, Dropbox is a remote file-storage application that
automatically syncs copies of a user’s digital files to Dropbox’s servers.316 These
files are then accessible to the user across multiple devices.317 In the context of
several of the cognitive models previously described, these stored files function
as classic examples of cognitive artifacts, in that they are artificial devices (here,
intangible) that carry representational information (little different from a
shopping list, calendar, or diary) created and deployed “for the purpose of
functionally contributing to performing a cognitive task”318 such as memory or
problem solving.
This conception of personal papers and their digital equivalents as cognitive
artifacts is entirely consistent with historical protections for personal papers:
The particular concern of eighteenth-century commentators focused

(“[C]ell phones and the services they provide are ‘such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life’ that
carrying one is indispensable to participation in modern society.” (quoting Riley v. California, 134 S.
Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014))).
310. Amber Case, We Are All Cyborgs Now, Speech at TEDWomen 2010, (Dec. 2010),
https://www.ted.com/talks/amber_case_we_are_all_cyborgs_now [https://perma.cc/GE46-AV9J].
311. Id. at 0:30.
312. See Richard Heersmink, Dimensions of Integration in Embedded and Extended Cognitive
Systems, 14 PHENOMENOLOGY & COGNITIVE SCI. 577, 581 (2015) [hereinafter Heersmink, Dimensions
of Integration].
313. Carina Chocano, The Dilemma of Being a Cyborg, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 27, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/29/magazine/what-happens-when-data-disappears.html
[https://
perma.cc/6FQW-MZT5] (“We’ve outsourced our memories to external devices. The result is that we
no longer trust our memories.”).
314. Sparrow et al., supra note 302, at 778.
315. Id.
316. See Shallman, supra note 154, at 50.
317. Id.
318. Heersmink, Taxonomy, supra note 290, at 471.
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on papers, such as diaries, intended solely for the use and perusal of
the author. In that era, writing out one’s ideas for purely private
analysis and reflection was seen as an essential part of the thought
process. Commentators regarded these writings as essentially
unspoken thoughts that had never left the bosom of the thinker.
Exposing to government scrutiny documents essential to the private
development of ideas would stultify normal intellectual life and
development.319
It was this view of personal papers as “an essential part of the thought
process”320 that justified their special status as a man’s “dearest property.”321
Likewise, what distinguishes cognitive artifacts from other objects of cognition is
their function as “integral components of the information processing task
itself.”322
Moreover, by offloading these files to Dropbox, the user employs additional
cognitive artifacts. Using Heersmink’s approach, both the Dropbox service on
which the file is stored and the computer through which the file is accessed can
be described as “provid[ing] task-relevant information, thereby complementing
internal storage and processing systems and making certain cognitive tasks
easier, faster, more reliable, or possible at all.”323 The concept of computer
systems as cognitive artifacts is certainly more contentious. But putting aside the
theoretical disputes within cognitive science, many if not most users perceive
Dropbox as significantly supporting, extending, and complementing cognitive
functions324 by extending their ability to “represent, store, retrieve and
manipulate information.”325 At first blush, this likely seems far afield of any
historical protections for personal papers, but this is not necessarily so. The
purpose of a journal or diary, for instance, is to collect and store individual
representational artifacts created by the author as an integral component of
personal memory, to be accessed as needed to contribute to the cognitive task of
remembering.326 Similarly, a personal library may function as a collection of
potential cognitive artifacts327 to be employed in various cognitive tasks, such as
abstract thought and problem solving. Both diaries and personal libraries are
paradigmatic examples in the history of constitutional protections for personal

319. Schnapper, supra note 36, at 926 (footnote omitted).
320. Id.
321. Id. at 882 (quoting Entick v. Carrington (1765) 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1066).
322. Brey, Human-Computer Interaction, supra note 56, at 388.
323. Heersmink, Metaphysics, supra note 300, at 79 (citations omitted).
324. Clowes, supra note 292, at 264.
325. Brey, Human-Computer Interaction, supra note 56, at 385.
326. See Heersmink, Dimensions of Integration, supra note 312, at 584; Seth F. Kreimer,
Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, Discourse, and the Right to Record, 159
U. PA. L. REV. 335, 380 (2011) (“When an individual records her sense impressions or draws sketches
in her diary, she constructs the scaffolding of her future thoughts much as interior memories construct
the scaffolding of cognition.”).
327. See Itiel E. Dror & Stevan Harnad, Offloading Cognition onto Cognitive Technology, in
COGNITION DISTRIBUTED 1, 18 (Itiel E. Dror & Stevan Harnad eds., 2008).
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papers.328
If we accept that, at the very least, the files we upload to Dropbox may be
deployed as cognitive artifacts that functionally contribute to the performance of
cognitive tasks, what does this add to our understanding of Fourth Amendment
protections for papers? As previously discussed, true freedom of thought
requires substantial protections for privacy of thought.329 And just as this
commitment protects the inner workings of the mind, so too must it also ensure
privacy for all aspects of our cognitive processes. Thus, when papers and their
digital equivalents are employed as cognitive artifacts—either as aids to our
cognitive processes or as aspects so integral to those processes as to be
constitutive of our cognitive systems330—they must be protected from
unreasonable government interference. The failure to do so frustrates
autonomous thought, and with it our ability to freely develop new ideas, discover
new truths, and test our beliefs. Yet that is the state of Fourth Amendment law
when the third-party doctrine is applied in the new information environment.
C.

Modifications to the Third-Party Doctrine

In this Part, I propose modifications intended to address the chilling effect
that “blunt application of the third-party doctrine”331 inflicts on autonomous
thought. My proposal proceeds from the following six assumptions, drawn from
the previous discussion:
1. Freedom of thought is an essential constitutional value grounded
primarily but not exclusively in First Amendment doctrine.
2. Freedom of thought requires privacy of thought, with protections
sufficient to safeguard freedom of thought from unreasonable government
interference.
3. The enumeration of “papers” as a distinct object of Fourth Amendment
protection reflects both the Founders’ commitment to freedom of thought
and their appreciation for the important role of personal papers in the
development of thoughts, ideas, and beliefs.
4. Modern cognitive science supports the Founders’ intuition as to the
importance of papers to our cognitive processes.
5. Consistent with several models of cognition, papers may function as
cognitive artifacts deployed by humans for the purpose of functionally
contributing to a cognitive task.
6. Privacy of thought (as a necessary condition of freedom of thought)
requires that papers functioning as cognitive artifacts be protected from

328. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624 (1886) (referencing protections for “private
books and papers”), abrogated by Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); Donohue, Digital World,
supra note 1, at 573 (citing William T. Rintala, The Mere Evidence Rule: Limitations on Seizure Under
the Fourth Amendment, 54 CAL. L. REV 2099, 2115–16 (1966)).
329. See supra Part III.A for a discussion of the necessity of substantial protections for privacy
of thought.
330. Smart et al., supra note 268, at 259–60.
331. United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 535 (11th Cir. 2015) (Martin, J., dissenting).

96

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

unreasonable government interference.
One conclusion to draw from these assumptions is that all papers have the
potential to function as cognitive artifacts; therefore, all papers should be
categorically excluded from governmental search and seizure. But this would
merely return us to the absolutist rule of Boyd, which in retrospect seems
untenable given the glut of digital papers now stored on third-party servers. We
might alternatively conclude that all papers should be subject to search and
seizure only with a valid warrant, perhaps subject to one or more of the existing
exceptions but not to the third-party doctrine. Although certainly a defensible
position, this undifferentiated approach would seem to prioritize cognitive
concepts (i.e., papers as cognitive artifacts) without adequate reference to the
basic constitutional principles those cognitive concepts help to explain.
My conclusion is a bit more measured. These cognitive concepts provide a
useful frame for understanding and appreciating the special status afforded
personal papers, distinct from other forms of property, under English and early
American law—an appreciation that now seems lost. That is not to say that we
are compelled, in service of freedom and privacy of thought, to exempt all
cognitive artifacts from governmental search and seizure. But it does suggest that
additional protections, guided by historical rationales and illuminated by modern
cognitive science, may be appropriate.
In fashioning a limited exemption, I attempt to avoid some of the extreme
results inherent in prior proposals by neither advocating for a return to nearabsolute protection nor ignoring the special status of papers and the challenges
of the new information environment.332 At the same time, however, I am mindful
that the Fourth Amendment often operates best where clear boundaries both
reflect and guide societal expectations.333 It would be entirely unhelpful, for
instance, given the mountains of data maintained on cloud-based services, to
suggest that privacy protections might turn on a case-by-case assessment of the
content of a particular paper and its role in an individual’s cognitive processes.

332. See, e.g., Price, supra note 106, at 249 (“‘[P]apers’ should be read to protect expressive and
associational data, regardless of its form, how it is created, or where it is located.”); Schnapper, supra
note 36, at 874 (“[T]he Supreme Court’s original view of the history and meaning of the fourth
amendment was correct: seizures of papers were condemned in eighteenth-century England without
respect to the validity of any underlying warrant . . . .”); Strandburg, supra note 25, at 622 (“[T]wo core
Fourth Amendment protected areas, the home and the office[,] . . . [should] be extended to encompass
certain digital social contexts.”); Tokson, Automation, supra note 12, at 647 (arguing that “information
disclosed only to automated systems” should be considered “private”).
333. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths
and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 861–62 (2004) (positing “rule clarity” as a goal of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence); Kerr, Third-Party Doctrine, supra note 21, at 581 (“The on/off
switch of the suppression remedy demands clear Fourth Amendment rules on what police conduct
triggers Fourth Amendment protection and what police conduct does not.”); Wayne R.
LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing “Bright Lines” and “Good
Faith”, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 307, 325–26 (1982) (setting forth various factors to consider when
determining whether to adopt bright-line rules in the Fourth Amendment context); Melanie D.
Wilson, The Return of Reasonableness: Saving the Fourth Amendment from the Supreme Court,
59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 39 (2008) (arguing in favor of “clear rules” in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence).

2018]

COGNITIVE THEORY

97

Indeed, the content of a particular paper is nearly irrelevant to its potential to
function as a cognitive artifact. Instead, I will attempt to identify a series of
proxies by which to distinguish a relatively narrow class of digital papers, the
protection of which is most likely to serve our commitment to freedom of
thought without unduly burdening society’s interest in effective law
enforcement.
The Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Carpenter supports this more
nuanced approach.334 Recognizing that “seismic shifts in digital technology”335
have transformed the traditional third-party doctrine into a blunt instrument,336
Carpenter held that sharing information with a third party may reduce one’s
expectation of privacy but does not necessarily eliminate it.337 Among the factors
the Court considered in this more contextual analysis were various features of
the underlying technology,338 the scope of the surveillance enabled by that
technology,339 and the nature of the information sought by the government.340 As
to these first two factors, cloud-computing and communications systems are
characterized by both the automated, pervasive collection of information and the
immense capacity to store that information indefinitely—the very characteristics
that the Carpenter Court found to caution against the uncritical extension of
Miller and Smith to new technologies.341
The third factor—the nature of the information sought by the
government—is the most relevant to my proposal. Having concluded that
different categories of information may be treated differently under the thirdparty doctrine,342 the Court recognized “a world of difference between the
limited types of personal information addressed in Smith and Miller” (i.e., bank
records and telephone numbers)343 “and the exhaustive chronicle of location
information” collected in Carpenter.344 Thus, where the information sought by
the government has the potential to be “sensitive”345 and “revealing” in its

334. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221–23 (2018) (holding that individuals
maintain a legitimate expectation of privacy in the extended record of their physical movements, as
revealed by cell site location information, and thus that a warrant is required to obtain that
information).
335. Id. at 2219.
336. See id. at 2222 (cautioning that existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence should not be
uncritically extended to new technologies).
337. Id. at 2221 (holding that an individual has a reduced expectation of privacy in shared
information, rather than no expectation of privacy).
338. See id. at 2214, 2219.
339. See id. at 2216–18.
340. See id.
341. See id. at 2214, 2216–18.
342. Id. at 2216–17.
343. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736–38 (1979) (telephone numbers); United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 436–38 (1976) (bank records).
344. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219. The Court also held that Smith and Miller were
distinguishable from Carpenter based on the category of information sought by the government. See id.
at 2216–17.
345. Id. at 2214.
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“depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach,”346 the mere fact that it is revealed to
or gathered by an automated third-party system “does not make [that
information] any less deserving of Fourth Amendment protection.”347 This
approach would seem to except from the third-party doctrine those cloudcomputing and communication systems that collect and store personal papers
containing our most personal thoughts and private concerns.
At the same time, focusing on personal papers answers one of the primary
concerns of the Carpenter dissenters, who criticized the majority for
“transform[ing] Miller and Smith into an unprincipled and unworkable
doctrine.”348 The dissenters took issue, in part, with the majority’s failure to
“explain what makes something a distinct category of information” deserving of
greater protection.349 But personal papers offer a rare point of general, if not
entirely clear or unanimous, agreement. Justice Roberts’s five-vote majority
opinion in Carpenter indicated that the warrant requirement should apply to an
individual’s digital papers, even when those papers are held by a third party.350
Dissents by Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito argued that Fourth
Amendment protections should be tethered to the text, acknowledging
constitutional safeguards for an individual’s “papers.”351 Justice Kennedy went a
step further, acknowledging that “Miller and Smith may not apply when the
Government obtains the modern-day equivalents of an individual’s own ‘papers’
or ‘effects,’ even when those papers or effects are held by a third party.”352
Justice Gorsuch not only accepted these propositions, but added that complete
ownership of the relevant papers may not be required to assert a Fourth
Amendment interest.353
In the following parts, I describe a subclass of personal papers that, as “a
distinct category of information,”354 are worthy of enhanced Fourth Amendment
protection. As I previously argued, personal papers may serve as cognitive
artifacts, functioning as key components of human cognition. Our constitutional
commitment to freedom of thought requires privacy of thought and thus privacy
protections for personal papers that serve this cognitive function. Such
extraordinary protection is consistent with the intuition of prior generations, who
wrote their intention to protect personal papers into the text of the Fourth
Amendment. The following groupings—undisclosed papers, shared confidences,
and directed transmissions—serve as proxies for identifying a relatively narrow
band of personal papers that are most likely to serve our commitment to
freedom of thought without unduly burdening society’s interest in effective law

346. Id. at 2223.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 2230 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
349. Id. at 2234.
350. Id. at 2222 (majority opinion).
351. Id. at 2227 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 2239 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2247 (Alito,
J., dissenting).
352. Id. at 2230 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
353. Id. at 2269 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
354. Id. at 2219 (majority opinion).
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enforcement.
1.

Undisclosed Papers

A strong claim for an exemption from the third-party doctrine can be made
for papers held in personal storage that are not intended and are unlikely to be
directly observed by another party. In Smith, the Supreme Court relied on what
Matthew Tokson called the “automation rationale” to find that telephone
numbers dialed by the defendant had been publicly exposed, even where the
telephone company’s system was entirely automated.355 In reaching this
conclusion, Tokson posited, the Court determined that “there is no legally
relevant difference between disclosure of one’s personal information to a third
party’s automated systems and disclosure to a human being.”356 Like Tokson,357 I
reject the automation rationale in large part because it perpetuates an all-ornothing approach to privacy that, in modern application, undermines basic
principles and expectations.358 “Virtually every kind of personal online data is
stored and processed by third-party automated equipment in order to route
communications, detect spam and viruses, block computer hackers, or generate
advertising revenue.”359 In this environment, the automation rationale
“threatens to undermine privacy rights in Internet data and potentially in all new
communications technologies, present and future.”360 Indeed, the Carpenter
Court went so far as to suggest that automated information collection cuts in
favor of Fourth Amendment protections, rather than against, because it creates a
constant, inescapable stream of data.361
Tokson’s insight provides one useful proxy by which to identify a workable
subclass of digital papers to be exempted from application of the third-party
doctrine. At the core of the historical connection between the Fourth
Amendment and freedom of thought is the protection for those “papers, such as
diaries, intended solely for the use and perusal of the author.”362 As the Father
of Candor wrote about the Wilkes affair, “Any man is at liberty to think, and to
put what thoughts he pleases upon paper, provided he does not publish them.”363
Another influential series of pamphlets circulated following Wilkes described

355. See Tokson, Automation, supra note 12, at 600; see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
744–45 (1979) (holding that no “different constitutional result is required because the telephone
company has decided to automate”).
356. Tokson, Automation, supra note 12, at 600; see also Smith, 442 U.S. at 744–45 (rejecting the
petitioner’s argument that automated switching equipment differs from a live operator in any
constitutionally relevant respect).
357. See Tokson, Automation, supra note 12, at 586 (proposing that the mere disclosure of data
to automated systems should not trigger the third-party doctrine where there is “only a minimal risk of
eventual exposure . . . to humans”).
358. See id. at 617–18.
359. Id. at 602.
360. Id. at 586.
361. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220, 2223.
362. Schnapper, supra note 36, at 926.
363. CANDOR, A LETTER FROM CANDOR, TO THE PUBLIC ADVERTISER 30 (2d ed. 1764).
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personal papers as “our closest confidents.”364 For “personal papers often
contain an individual’s most private thoughts, never intended to be disclosed to
anyone else, ‘things that the world never saw and no man has a right to look
upon.’”365
As this history makes clear, a more circumscribed reading of the special
status of personal papers would emphasize the intent of the individual to keep
his thoughts private—“solely for the use and perusal of the author”366—and thus
free from government interference. In an automated system where access by a
human is exceedingly unlikely,367 at least in the absence of a government order
or request, the user’s intent to keep secret his thoughts from the service provider
seems both clear and reasonable. In this context, rigid application of the thirdparty doctrine and the automation rationale, without regard for the user’s intent
to disclose, fails to adequately account for even a narrow conception of the role
that personal papers play in the processes of human thought. Whether personal
papers are understood as “the private workings of a person’s mind”368 or as
cognitive artifacts “deployed by human agents for the purpose of functionally
contributing to performing a cognitive task,”369 the basic values of freedom and
privacy of thought require at the very least that undisclosed papers remain
protected from government interference.
Applying these principles in the cloud-computing environment, the
strongest claim for exemption from the third-party doctrine would be for the
personal storage of digital papers maintained by the user of a cloud-based
service where those papers are not intended and are unlikely to be directly
observed by another party. A remote possibility that the service itself might
access the digital paper in its ordinary course of network management would be
irrelevant, as the intent to maintain privacy through nondisclosure does not
require perfect concealment.370 Common applications of this exemption would
include files maintained in remote storage (e.g., Dropbox, Google Drive, iCloud)
and photo applications (e.g., Flickr, Photobucket), files replicated in automated
back-up systems (e.g., Carbonite, iDrive), files created in cloud-based
applications (e.g., Microsoft Office, Google Docs), and curated files in

364. CHARLES WYNDHAM & GEORGE MONTAGU-DUNK, A LETTER TO THE RIGHT
HONOURABLE THE EARLS OF EGREMONT AND HALIFAX, HIS MAJESTY’S PRINCIPAL SECRETARIES OF
STATE, ON THE SEIZURE OF PAPERS 8 (1763).
365. Schnapper, supra note 36, at 890 (quoting WYNDHAM & MONTAGU-DUNK, supra note 364,
at 25).
366. Id. at 926.
367. Tokson, Automation, supra note 12, at 607 (noting that even the least intrusive
opportunities for human observation have nearly disappeared as “network monitoring and threatresponse processes have themselves increasingly become automated”).
368. Dripps, supra note 3, at 66–67 (summarizing the views of Chief Justice Pratt in Entick v.
Carrington).
369. Heersmink, Taxonomy, supra note 290, at 471.
370. See, e.g., CANDOR, supra note 363, at 30 (noting that protections for private papers rest on
the intent to remain unpublished, rather than some form of perfect concealment); see also Carpenter v.
United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2216–17 (2018) (concluding that the third-party doctrine does not
necessarily apply to information created by the service provider in the ordinary course of business).
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organization and annotation applications (e.g., Evernote, Scrivener). This
exemption would also apply to unsent drafts of emails and other forms of
communication.
2.

Shared Confidences

A somewhat more nuanced claim for an exemption from the third-party
doctrine can be made for papers shared within certain discrete groups of
individuals. Neil Richards has observed that “the development of ideas and
beliefs” occurs not only in “solitary contemplation” but often in “collaboration
with a few trusted confidants.”371 Indeed, both Entick and Wilkes, the leading
English cases on protections for personal papers, involved the collaboration of
like-minded provocateurs.372 Helen Nissenbaum embraced a similar notion,373
recognizing that “[i]n some contexts, people expect shared information to be
held in strict confidence or limited to a small group of confidants.”374 Under the
third-party doctrine, however, the exposure of information among confidants
may well vitiate Fourth Amendment protections.375 But this all-or-nothing
approach “means failing to recognize degrees of privacy in the Fourth
Amendment context,” for “it treats exposure to a limited audience as morally
equivalent to exposure to the whole world.”376
Tying this back to cognitive science, it may be helpful to introduce the
collective cognition model—“forms of cognition in which the relevant cognitive
processes (e.g., reasoning, remembering and problem-solving) are distributed
across a collection of individuals”377—as well as the closely connected concepts
of collective memory and transactive memory. Collective memory
concerns the manner in which information is represented in a group.
Information may be shared collectively among all of the individuals in
a group such that each person possesses knowledge in common, or
alternatively, information may be distributed or divided among
individuals . . . . [Thus,] group processes may result in shared memories
that are different from individual memories.378

371. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, supra note 37, at 389; see also Daniel J. Solove, The First
Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 121–22 (2007) (“[P]olitical discourse does
not just occur on soapboxes before large crowds; it also thrives in private enclaves between small
groups of people.”).
372. See Donohue, Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 32, at 1196–204.
373. See Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 141–42
(2004) (discussing norms of information flow in the context of friendship).
374. See Shaun B. Spencer, The Surveillance Society and the Third-Party Privacy Problem, 65
S.C. L. REV. 373, 382–83 (2013) (discussing Nissenbaum, supra note 373).
375. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“What a person knowingly exposes to
the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.” (first
citing Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966); then citing United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559,
563 (1927))).
376. Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine
and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 122 (2002).
377. Smart et al., supra note 268, at 272.
378. Mary Susan Weldon & Krystal D. Bellinger, Collective Memory: Collaborative and
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Transactive memory may best be thought of as a group strategy for managing
large amounts of information.379 “Individuals create a division of labor for
encoding, storing, and retrieving task-relevant information; each individual
specializes in one or more knowledge domains . . . . [W]hen individuals need
information in others’ areas of expertise, they can query those experts rather
than having to invest personally in learning that information.”380
These are admittedly contentious theories presented—not for the truth of
the matter but merely to illustrate how collaborative freedom of thought might
be understood. As an example, one potential consequence of distributing
cognitive tasks among a group of collaborative individuals is the emergence of
distinct thoughts and ideas generated from “shared memories that are different
from individual memories”381—thoughts and ideas beyond those accessible to
the individual in isolation—and thus distinctly valued. From this perspective, the
collaborative processes of collective cognition present unique challenges for
freedom and privacy of thought. Far from intending to maintain secrecy through
nondisclosure, each individual within the collective intends to share his personal
papers with the group. Thus, where “the development of ideas and beliefs”
occurs in “collaboration with a few trusted confidants,”382 protection for
autonomous thought might well require that we safeguard the processes by
which “[i]nformation may be shared,”383 including the sharing of personal
papers.
The question, of course, is where do we draw the line between protecting
“collaboration with a few trusted confidants”384 and evisceration of the thirdparty doctrine? I suggest two key factors: First, the use of access controls. And
second, limitations on the number and nature of individuals permitted access.
Restricted access is a well-developed concept in regard to privacy rights in
spaces, objects, and communications. One particularly relevant line of cases

Individual Processes in Remembering, 23 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1160, 1161 (1997) (citations
omitted). Weldon and Bellinger identified at least four conceptions of collective memory. See id. at
1160–61. The first is that “remembering may take place as a social activity” in which people
“collaborate to recall events.” Id. at 1160. What emerges are “different individuals’ recollections,” in
the context of and influenced by the “social context.” Id. The second recognizes that individual
remembering “is situated within a larger culture or group which, in the practice of its activities, teaches
its members to use memory in a particular way.” Id. at 1161. This explains, in part, why “the content
and process of recall differ across cultures.” Id. The third, discussed here, “concerns the manner in
which information is represented in a group.” Id. Finally, collective memory can be socially and
culturally important, because it frames our perception of various individuals, groups, and events. Id.
379. Erez Reuveni, Copyright, Neuroscience, and Creativity, 64 ALA. L. REV. 735, 766–67 (2013)
(discussing transactive memory in the context of small group dynamics).
380. Y. Connie Yuan et al., Access to Information in Connective and Communal Transactive
Memory Systems, 34 COMM. RES. 131, 132–33 (2007). Key to the success of such a system is what has
been called expertise recognition. Id. at 133. Essentially, the effective retrieval of dispersed information
in a traditional transactive memory system requires each member of the group to know “whom to
query for information or answers in areas of expertise outside their own.” Id.
381. Weldon & Bellinger, supra note 378, at 1161.
382. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, supra note 37, at 388–89.
383. Weldon & Bellinger, supra note 378, at 1161.
384. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, supra note 37, at 388–89.
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holds that individuals have a Fourth Amendment interest in password-protected
and/or encrypted digital files.385 Applying this principle to cloud computing, the
adequacy of restricted access would turn on the access controls available on a
particular platform, the default settings for that platform, and affirmative steps
by the user to limit access.
But how much access is too much? Apart from the binary default
requirements of absolute concealment and nondisclosure, the Fourth
Amendment has little to say regarding the sharing of information among small
groups of individuals.386 The First Amendment, however, may offer some
guidance. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,387 the Supreme Court characterized
the freedom of association as serving, in part, to foster special communities of
thought388 in which ideals and beliefs are cultivated.389 Recognizing, however,
that not all communities serve these values, the Court sought to distinguish
between those communities with strong associational claims and those “lacking
these qualities.”390 It identified several relevant characteristics, including size,
purpose, policies, selectivity, and congeniality.391 Relatively small, highly
selective groups were to be favored, particularly where critical aspects of the
relationship were secluded from others.392 Given the instrumental connection
between freedom of thought and freedom of association, these same factors may
be applied to determine whether the size and nature of a particular collaborative
group having shared access to cloud-based digital papers serves the
constitutional values of autonomous thought.
3.

Directed Transmissions

Finally, the strongest claim for an exemption from the third-party doctrine
can be made for email and other forms of directed electronic communication, the
status of which remains unsettled. As a subset of shared confidences, privacy
protections for directed transmissions—communications directed to a particular
person, generally to the exclusion of others—remain uniquely valued as a matter
of law and tightly bound to their constitutional pedigree. In Ex parte Jackson, the
Supreme Court held that “[l]etters and sealed packages . . . are as fully guarded

385. Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 403–04 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that one user of a shared
computer lacked the authority to consent to the search of another user’s password-protected files);
Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV.
1005, 1021 (2010) (“Storing [a] file on a password-protected server is the virtual equivalent of keeping
it in a home.”); Michael Mestitz, Unpacking Digital Containers: Extending Riley’s Reasoning to Digital
Files and Subfolders, 69 STAN. L. REV. 321, 354–55 (2017) (discussing cases in which passwordprotection and/or encryption were key factors).
386. See generally Bedi, Facebook, supra note 19 (proposing that the Fourth Amendment
should, through the mosaic theory, provide a level of protection for group communication).
387. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
388. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620.
389. Id. at 618–19.
390. Id. at 620.
391. Id. (noting that other characteristics might also be pertinent in a particular case).
392. Id.
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from examination and inspection, except as to their outward form and weight, as
if they were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own domiciles.”393
Referencing the Fourth Amendment explicitly, the Court declared:
The constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in
their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to
their papers, thus closed against inspection, wherever they may be . . . .
[T]hey can only be opened and examined under like warrant . . . as is
required when papers are subjected to search in one’s own
household.394
This remains the law today, more than 140 years after it was decided.395
What of email and other forms of directed electronic communication, in
which third-party intermediaries and online service providers process and store
the information? Absent a recognized exception to the third-party doctrine,
email would seem to constitute information exposed to the public (i.e., to a thirdparty intermediary analogous to the telephone company in Smith).396
Nevertheless, it is usually presented as settled law that Jackson applies equally to
email.397
First, for government officials to access the contents of e-mails or other
electronic communications, they must obtain a warrant based upon
probable cause absent a warrant exception. Second, if the government
seeks non-content information such as subscriber information, the
to/from line on an e-mail, or the IP addresses of websites visited, a
subpoena will generally suffice.398
Officials of the U.S. Department of Justice have publicly stated that the
department accepts this content/non-content distinction.399 But others push back
on this assertion. At a recent public event, Jennifer Lynch of the Electronic
Frontier Foundation reported that government litigators had in certain cases
sought to “undermine . . . settled law, or what we thought was settled law”
regarding Fourth Amendment protections for the content of email.400 Fellow
panelist Laura Donohue echoed this assessment.401 It is worth noting that the
Supreme Court has yet to weigh in on the matter and the lower courts are more
divided on the question than many have suggested.402

393. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878).
394. Id.
395. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2230 (2018) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting
the continued adherence to Ex parte Jackson).
396. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979).
397. See, e.g., THOMPSON II, CLOUD COMPUTING, supra note 151, at 2–3.
398. Id. at 6.
399. See Am. Bar Ass’n Criminal Justice Section, Part 2: The New Frontier Surveillance
Technology, Ethics, and the Law, YOUTUBE (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=ocXYJSzI1sw [https://perma.cc/VZU2-5K2M] (statement of Nathan P. Judish, Senior Counsel,
Comput. Crimes & Intellectual Prop. Section, Criminal Div., Dep’t of Justice, at 15:45–16:20).
400. See id. (statement of Jennifer Lynch, Elec. Frontier Found., at 21:18–22:48) (“The Justice
Department, for example, has never conceded that email is not subject to the third-party doctrine.”).
401. See id. (statement of Laura K. Donohue, Dir., Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., at 25:28–27:16).
402. Compare, e.g., United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1304–05 (10th Cir. 2016)
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If we accept that the principle of nondisclosure may, in certain contexts,
survive sharply limited publication, then application of Jackson to email is
consistent with both the collective cognition model and the historical rationale
for safeguarding private papers.403 Other forms of direct messaging using similar
access controls (e.g., encryption, password protection) merit the same protection,
even where the somewhat tortured analogy to regular mail is more difficult to
maintain. These include direct messaging via such services as Twitter, Facebook,
Instagram, and iMessage.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have endeavored to do three things. First, I have attempted
to show that our constitutional commitment to freedom of thought is historically
and properly connected to the enumeration of “papers” as a distinct object of
Fourth Amendment protection. Second, I have sought to revive the connection
between freedom of thought and personal papers by reference to modern models
of human cognition, explaining how papers serve as cognitive artifacts
functioning within a cognitive system and performing cognitive tasks. Third, I
have proposed changes to the third-party doctrine that are intended to safeguard
a relatively narrow class of digital papers, the protection of which is most likely
to serve our commitment to freedom of thought.
As an ever-greater proportion of our transactions and interactions take
place online, generating enormous amounts of data to be processed and stored
by intermediaries and service providers, we must decide how legal doctrine built
around desks, closets, and file cabinets should be adapted to always-on
connectivity and cloud-computing networks. Although many have identified and
sought to rectify the privacy problems created by this shift, it has proven difficult
to articulate a limitation to the third-party doctrine that is both consistent with
existing principles and feasible in practice.
This Article represents a new approach to that difficult problem. Historical
understanding is supported with insight from contemporary cognitive science,
translating the intuition of prior generations into current cognitive theory. These
principles are then adapted into a set of proxy characteristics that distinguish
those personal papers most likely to serve our constitutional values. The
resulting approach provides a coherent and workable method for limiting the
reach of the third-party doctrine and returning equilibrium to information
privacy.

(discussing the unsettled nature of the issue), with, e.g., People v. Thompson, 28 N.Y.S.3d 237, 252–53
(Sup. Ct. 2016) (presenting it as a settled issue).
403. See Schnapper, supra note 36, at 889–90 (arguing that “an individual’s papers ordinarily
include confidential communications with others”). See also supra Part III.C.2 for a discussion of
collective cognition and supra Part III.A for a discussion of the historic rationale for safeguarding
private papers.

